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ABSTRACT
Airport delays are a significant problem in the United States air transportation system. Between 1997 and
2000 the number of flights delayed increased by between 20 and 25% per year, despite only a 3 to 5%
increase in enplanements per year. Newark International Airport (EWR), one of New York City's
primary airports, is one of the airports in the United States most impacted by delays. Newark had the
highest percentage of operations delayed in 1999, and was second only to LaGuardia Airport in 2000.
Nearly 85% of delays at Newark are caused by adverse weather impacting the airport. Because of limited
capacity and a very full schedule operated at the airport, when adverse weather impacts the airport
departure operations are severely delayed. Despite this, unlike the national average, delays at Newark
have not increased significantly since 1998. This indicates that the airlines, air traffic control (ATC), and
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have successfully adapted.
On June 29, 2000, a research team from MIT visited Newark Airport to identify the key problems and
assess the effectiveness of any adaptations made. Results of this study indicate that airspace capacity
limitations downstream of the airport become a primary flow constraint at the airport, and that when these
constraints occur they are the source of most surface delays.
Responses to the delays at Newark have been both tactical and strategic. Key tactical ATC responses
examined include the application of restrictions; re-routing with the help of the National Playbook; the
use of decision-aiding tools; improved inter-facility communication; and utilization of runway 11-29.
Key strategic ATC responses examined include the formation of the Air Traffic Control System
Command Center, and the New York airspace redesign. A number of tactical airline responses to delays
were also examined, including cancellation of low priority flights and the transfer of the passengers to
ground transportation; pre-sequencing of departures; and improved access to information. Key strategic
responses examined include changes to the schedule operated at the airport, and particularly flattening out
of the banks operated; a new fleet, which requires less maintenance and has greater dispatch reliability;
and improved relations with the FAA and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
After examination of the problems at the 10 most delayed airports in the United States, the applicability
of the key responses identified at Newark to these airports was also examined in detail. Those airports for
which the most responses were identified to be applicable were Atlanta, San Francisco, Philadelphia and
Dallas/Fort Worth. Those responses identified to be most applicable to other airports were the further
extension of the National Playbook to other regions, the use of decision aiding tools, airspace redesign,
pre-sequencing of departures, and a decrease in the number of operations at the airport. A policy analysis
was completed for each of these responses.
Thesis Supervisor: John-Paul B. Clarke
Title: Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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NOMENCLATURE
ACRONYMS:
ABE Lehigh Valley International Airport, Allentown, Pennsylvania (Airport Code)
ACARS Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System
APREQ APproval REQuest
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASQP Airline Service Quality Performance
ATA Air Transport Association
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCSCC Air Traffic Control System Command Center
ATCT Air Traffic Control Tower
BWI Baltimore Washington International Airport (Airport Code)
CDM Collaborative Decision Making
CLT Charlotte/Douglas International Airport (Airport Code)
CODAS Consolidated Operations and Delays Analysis System
CPR Continental Recovery Plan
DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (Airport Code)
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (Airport Code)
DOT Department Of Transport
DSP Departure Spacing Program
EA Environmental Assessment
EDT Eastern Daylight Time
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
ETMS Enhanced Traffic Management System
EWR Newark International Airport (Airport Code)
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FDIO Flight Data Information Operation
GDP Ground Delay Program
GI General Information
GMT Greenwich Mean Time (also called Zulu time)
HVR Historically Validated Restriction
LAD Washington Dulles International Airport (Airport Code)
IDS-4 Information Display System-4
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System
JFK John F Kennedy International Airport (Airport Code)
LAHSO Land and Hold Operations
LGA LaGuardia Airport (Airport Code)
McTMA Multi-Center Traffic Management Advisor
MINIT MINutes In Trail
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MIT Miles In Trail, or Massachusetts Institute of Technology (depending on context)
NAS National Airspace System
NCDC National Climate Data Center
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NEXRAD NEXt generation weather RADar
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NYDP New York Departure Pit Complex
OAG Official Airline Guide
O-D Origin-Destination
OIS Operations Information System
ORD Chicago O'Hare International Airport (Airport Code)
ORF Norfolk International Airport (Airport Code)
PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
PHL Philadelphia International Airport (Airport Code)
SNA John Wayne-Orange Country Airport (Airport Code)
SNCF Societd Nationale des Chemins de fer Frangais
SWAP Severe Weather Avoidance Program
TEB Teterboro Airport (Airport Code)
TMA Traffic Management Advisor
TMC Traffic Management Coordinator
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol
VFR Visual Flight Rules
WSI Weather Services International Corp.
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CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Because the demand for air travel continues to increase, whereas system capacity has become
difficult to increase accordingly, airport delays have progressively become a significant problem in the
U.S. air transportation system. Figure 1 shows the number of delays system wide from 1995 to 2000,
alongside the number of domestic enplanements in the U.S. over the same period [1][2]. As the figure
shows, enplanements have grown at a steady rate of between 3 and 5% each year since 1995, while the
number of delays have increased at a rate of between 20 to 25% per year since 1997. The year 2000
shows a record high of 450,289 delays, and although enplanements and delays are likely to be lower in
2002 because of the consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, enplanements, and thus
delays, are expected to return to previous levels quickly, leading to continued increases in delays.
Thousand Operations Delayed -w- U Mllion Enplanements
500 ----- - -------------- 700.00
450- 600.00
400-
350- 500.00
300- 400.00
250-
200 -300.00
150- 200.00
100-
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0 0.00
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Figure 1. US domestic enplanements and number of delays system wide [1][2].
One of the most delayed airports in the United States is Newark International Airport (airport
code EWR). Newark is one of the three primary airports in the New York Metropolitan area, the others
being John F Kennedy International Airport (JFK) and LaGuardia Airport (LGA). In 1999 Newark had
the highest percentage of delayed operations of all airports in the United States, at 7.9% [3]. In 2000 this
17
percentage increased to 8.1% of operations, putting it second only to LaGuardia in percentage of delayed
operations [3]. The delays at LaGuardia were a result of the lifting of regulations at the airport according
to the Air 21 legislation [4].
According to the Air Transportation Association, Newark airport also had the highest average air
traffic control (ATC) departure delays of any airport in the country in both 1999 and 2000. In 1999
Newark operated with an average ATC departure delay of 19.5 minutes, followed by Washington Dulles
(lAD) at 16 minutes. In 2000 Newark operated at an average ATC departure delay of 18.5 minutes,
followed by LaGuardia at just over 15 minutes [5][6]. These numbers suggest that in comparison to other
airports, ATC delays are a major contributor to delays at Newark airport.
The annual percentage increase in delays at Newark, since 1995, is presented in Figure 2,
alongside that for NAS. The data was calculated from the Newark and system wide delay history [2]. It is
clear that since 1997 delays have increased at a slower rate at Newark than system wide, compared to
1996 when the increase in delays was significantly higher than system wide. From 1999 to 2000 the
increase in delays was only 1.6%, compared to the 19% increase system wide [2]. It thus appears that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airlines and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(PANYNJ) have been able to adapt their operations at Newark to reduce delays. This study thus examines
the operations at Newark, and the responses to delays by ATC and the airlines, to identify the responses
that were most effective in reducing delays.
Percentage Annual Increase in Delays
120% - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
100%
8 System Wide80% -
m Newark
60% -
40% -
20% -
0% -
-20%-- ----- -
1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
Year
Figure 2. Percentage annual increase in delays at Newark airport, and system wide.
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1.2 CAUSE OF DELAYS
Figure 3 shows the average distribution of reported arrival delays according to where the delay
was accumulated, as recorded by the Air Transportation Association (ATA) member delay reporting
program, from January to September 1999 [5]. The figure shows that the majority of delays are
accumulated during taxi out (53%). This is because ground holding is used extensively in the United
States, in which aircraft are delayed at their origin if the predicted demand at their destination is expected
to exceed the predicted capacity. Thus the majority of the control of flights is performed before departure,
and consequently the majority of the inefficiencies, and thus delays, manifest in departure operations.
Gate
8%
Taxi-in
15%/
Taxi-out
53%
Airborne
24%/
Figure 3. Distribution of delay time, ATA member delay reporting program, January- September 1999.
Figure 4 shows a pie chart of the breakdown of the causes of ATC delay in the National Airspace
System (NAS), as identified by the FAA [6]. According to the chart 68.7% of ATC delays in the NAS
were caused by weather in 2000. Weather has also been identified as a primary cause of delays at Newark
airport. Figure 5 shows the breakdown of causes of delays at Newark, according to Allan, Gaddy and
Evans, at Lincoln Laboratories [7]. This chart shows that a total of 84% of arrival delays at Newark are
related to weather (68% to local weather, and 16% to weather elsewhere). Weather generally has a
greater impact on departure operations than arrival operations, because of the use of ground holding in
the United States. Local weather also affects departures to as great an extent as it affects arrivals. It may
thus be inferred that weather is also the primary cause of departure delays at Newark.
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Figure 4. National causes of ATC delays in 2000 - Source: FAA [6].
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Figure 5. Cumulative delay impact at Newark (Sept. 1998 - Aug 1999) [7].
The chart in Figure 6 shows the number of delays at Newark and the total annual precipitation,
from 1995 to 2000. The data for total annual precipitation at Newark airport was collected from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Climate Data Center (NCDC) [8].
As the figure shows, the total precipitation at Newark is fairly consistent from 1995 to 2000 except for
1996 when precipitation was greater. The number of delays was also clearly greater in 1996, breaking
away from the trend of the rest of the data, suggesting further that weather has a particularly significant
impact on delays at the airport. The increase in delays after 1997 however appears to be driven by other
factors than weather alone.
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of yearly delays and inches of precipitation - Newark [2][8].
1.2.1 Cause of Weather Delays at Newark
Weather delays are caused by sensitivity of an airport to adverse weather, the frequency of
adverse weather at the airport, the schedule operated by the airlines relative to the capacity of the airport,
and airspace congestion in the terminal area.
The average reduction in airport capacity caused by adverse weather can be determined by
comparing VFR (Visual Flight Rules) and IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) airport capacities. According to
the FAA Airport Capacity Benchmark report [9], the reduction in capacity at Newark due to adverse
weather is 24% of the average VFR capacity. This is only slightly higher than the average of the 31
busiest airports in the United Sates (21.43% of average VFR capacity). This sensitivity to adverse
weather is related primarily to runway and gate limitations. Newark's parallel runways are only 950 feet
apart and thus too close together for independent IFR parallel approaches, and runway 11-29 is too short
for many jet operations and thus has limited usage. The airport also has high gate utilization, forcing
flights to pushback despite high departure delays, instead of holding at the gates. An airport diagram is
shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Airport diagram, Newark Intl (EWVR), Newark, NJ [ 10].
The frequency of adverse weather can be determined by examining the percentage of IFR
operations at Newark relative to other airports. According to the Airline Service Quality Performance
(ASQP) data in June 2000, 20.5% of operations at Newark were IFR, which is again slightly higher than
the average for the 31 busiest airports in the Unites States (16.3%).
The impact of adverse weather on the airport can be estimated by multiplying the percentage
drop in capacity caused by adverse weather and the percentage IFR operations. Normalizing relative to
the average for the 31 busiest airports in the United States Newark is 1.4 times as impacted by adverse
weather as the average. This is significant as, according to this measure, the only other airports more
severely impacted by weather are Dallas/Fort Worth (1.71), St. Louis (2.05), Boston (2.26) and San
Francisco (2.29). Figure 8 shows the weather impact metric for the 31 busiest airports in the United
States.
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Figure 8. Impact of weather on the airport - product of percentage capacity drop and percentage
frequency of weather on airports, normalized relative to the average, June 2000.
The impact of the weather delays on an airline's schedule is also related to the schedule operated
relative to the normal airport capacity and the bad weather capacity. The chart in Figure 9 shows the
schedule at Newark in June 2001. It is clear that the airport is actually scheduled beyond even the normal
VFR capacity in some cases and well beyond bad weather IFR capacity in most instances. At normal
capacity however there are enough recovery periods to meet the schedule with relatively few delays.
With the decrease in capacity caused by bad weather, however, it is clear that the schedule is more
severely impacted, and that the recovery periods are far fewer, far smaller, and far shorter. Consequently
delays are likely to propagate throughout the day.
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Figure 9. Average daily arrivals and departures per 30 minute interval - June 2001.
Airspace Congestion also contributes to delays at Newark airport. At most airports airspace
congestion is related directly to the schedule operated at the airport, but at Newark, because it is one of
four significant airports in the area (Newark, JFK, LaGuardia and Teterboro), this is not the case.
Because of their close proximity to one another the arrival and departure paths to and from the airports
overlap, meaning that operations must be coordinated and problems at any single airport impact
operations at the other three airports as well. The airspace is designed accordingly with Newark
operations particularly restricted to the east of the airport, to accommodate LaGuardia and JFK arrival
and departure routes. The FAA has also identified New York airspace congestion as a primary concern as
the two top chokepoints identified within the NAS [11] are the west and north departures from the New
York Metroplex. These apply particularly to the west and north departures from Newark and LaGuardia.
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1.3 SYSTEM OPERATION
1.3.1 Air Traffic Control Operations
The basic role of the ATC system in the United States is to prevent collisions between aircraft
that fly in the system, and to organize and expedite the safe and orderly flow of air traffic whilst utilizing
the airspace as efficiently as possible [12]. In the airspace around major airports, such as Newark, these
goals are achieved through the use of the departure fixes, restrictions and re-routes.
Departure Fixes
A simplified map of the New York airspace layout is shown in Figure 10, showing the primary
fixes used for departures from Newark. The primary departure fixes are identified below along with lists
of destinations for which the fixes are commonly used.
. GAYEL and COATE, associated with jet-routes J95 and J36, are generally used for northwest
bound traffic, such as that to Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP), Seattle (SEA), and San Francisco (SFO)
through GAYEL, and Chicago O'Hare (ORD) through COATE.
. ELIOT (associated with J60 and J80), PARKE (associated with J6), LANNA (associated with J48)
and BIGGY (associated with J75) are generally used for traffic to the west, the southwest, and the
south. ELIOT is generally used for traffic to the Midwest and the west coast, including Cleveland
(CLE), Kansas City (MCI), Denver (DEN), Los Angeles (LAX), and Honolulu (HNL). PARKE is
generally used for traffic to the southwest, Texas, and the South, including San Diego (SAN),
Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW), Nashville (BNA), and Washington Dulles (LAD). LANNA is generally
used for traffic to Texas, and the Deep South, including Houston (IAH), New Orleans (MSY), and
Atlanta (ATL). BIGGY is generally used for traffic to the South, including Washington National
(DCA), Baltimore (BWI), Charlotte (CLT), and Tampa (TPA).
. WHITE, associated with J209, is generally used for traffic to the South, to Florida, and to Central
and South America, including Norfolk (ORF), Orlando (ORL), Fort Lauderdale (FLL), Miami
(MIA), and Caracas Venezuela (CCS).
. GREKI and MERIT are generally used for traffic to the north, and to Europe, including Montreal
(YUL) and Burlington, VT (BTV) through GREKI and Boston (BOS) and all of Europe through
MERIT.
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Figure 10. Primary departure fixes for Newark International Airport.
Restrictions
Restrictions are applied to fixes and jet-routes in order to regulate traffic flow within the system.
A number of types of restrictions exist. The most commonly used are as follows:
. Miles in Trail (MIT) and Minutes in Trail (MINIT) - Specific separation between aircraft in miles
and minutes respectively.
. Approval Request (APREQ) - Aircraft must request approval to push back from gate. Approvals
given on a case-by-case basis. Normally used for aircraft flying to airports with active delay
programs.
. Fix closures - Complete closure of a fix, i.e. no traffic allowed through the fix. Effectively an
extreme form of MIT/MINIT.
. Ground Delay programs (GDPs) at destination/arrival airports - Implemented to control air traffic
volume to airports where the projected traffic demand is expected to exceed the airport's
acceptance rate for a lengthy period. Normally initiated when the airport's acceptance rate is
reduced, e.g. due to adverse weather. [13]
Small separation adjustments, such as the stretching of the minimum 3 MIT separation inside
TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol) airspace to the minimum 5 MIT en-route separation, can
be accomplished in the TRACON airspace by vectoring the aircraft. Such vectoring does however
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involve high controller workload, and thus when large separations adjustments are required, such as in
most specified MIT or MINIT restrictions, the restrictions must be imposed at the runway.
Because a GDP restricts flow into the airport, it increases arrival delays, which are those statistics
reported to the Department of Transport (DOT). Consequently airlines prefer to avoid GDPs at their hub
airports. According to Continental management at Newark GDPs are, however, essential for efficient
operation at Newark airport. When poor weather impacts the airport, restrictions are applied to departures
regardless of whether a GDP is implemented. With no GDP, departures are delayed whilst arrivals
continue to land according to schedule. There is thus normal flow into the airport but limited flow out of
it, leading to surface congestion. The demand for gates means that flights must be pushed back to hold on
the taxiways instead of at the gate. However, parking space is also limited, and taxiways quickly become
congested. If a GDP is implemented, however, arrivals are also delayed, effectively delaying the whole
schedule. Although the statistics are poor this avoids the surface congestion problems and allows for
efficient airport operation, which reduces departure delays. GDPs, although not popular with the airline
headquarters, are thus important for effective operation at Newark airport.
Re-routes
It is clear that if a specific route has severe restrictions, or is closed, re-routing of flights is
preferred. However, dynamic re-routing is difficult. This is because all facilities affected by the re-route
must agree to the re-route a priori. This often involves a high number of facilities, requiring extensive
inter-facility communication and cooperation. This takes time, and re-routes are thus often only approved
after the weather has moved, and the re-route is no longer useful.
A set of preplanned re-routes for specific fix and jet-route closures was thus developed for the
NAS, although currently focuses on the New York airspace. This is known as the National Playbook and
was developed by the Severe Weather Group at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center
(ATCSCC). The National Playbook was developed to give the ATCSCC, field facilities, and system users
a common product for identification of re-route opportunities. The playbook contains the most common
scenarios that occur each severe weather season. Each "play" includes the resource or flow impacted,
facilities included, and specific routes for each facility involved. The playbook is available on the
ATCSCC web site and is updated every 56 days [14]. The National Playbook does however have
limitations, as it does not cover all possible fix and jet-route closure combinations. The plays must also
often be used in conjunction with other strategies, as they are not adequate to solve the problem alone.
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1.3.2 Airline Operations
Newark airport has three terminals, Terminal A, B and C. Terminal A, which has 25 gates, is
used for operations for most domestic airlines, including some Continental operations (6 gates). Most
Continental flights operate from Terminal C, which has 42 gates, all of which are operated by
Continental. Terminal B, which has 23 gates, is operated by the PANYNJ for international arrivals.
Continental operates a hub at the airport, and including Continental Express, operates
approximately 55% of operations at Newark, making it the dominant airline. Continental operates an
operations center and ramp tower, and since it operates all the gates at Terminal C, has been given control
of the taxiways surrounding Terminal C. During adverse weather Continental is also given control of an
extended ramp area according to a letter of agreement with the FAA. This includes a number of taxiways
near runway 11-29, and sometimes, if it is not being used and congestion is high, runway 11-29 as well.
According to the letter of agreement with the FAA during the extended ramp operations all other airlines
on these taxiways take preference over Continental aircraft. A number of parking areas also exist. Using
these and the Continental controlled taxiways Continental is able to perform pre-sequencing of its aircraft
before they are transitioned to FAA control. The aircraft are pre-sequenced according to their departure
fixes and because the FAA operates on a first come first serve basis, this allows Continental to reduce its
departure delays.
Load planning and dispatch are performed at Continental headquarters in Houston. Other
operations, such as gate management, maintenance, catering, and baggage handling are managed locally.
Most of these functions are controlled or performed from within the Continental operations center.
1.3.3 System Dynamics in Adverse Weather - Site Visit, June 29, 2000
In order to identify the causes of delays at Newark, a detailed study was performed of the
weather, air traffic control and airline performance during a period when operations at Newark were
severely restricted i.e. June 29, 2000. This day was severely impacted by summer thunderstorms, and in
the middle of the summer, when demand for air travel was high. This day was also the Thursday before
the "Fourth or July" weekend, so traffic through the airport was high in preparation for the long weekend.
The site visit also coincided with the "worst summer ever" i.e. the worst summer of airport delays in
history. A team from MIT observed operations and collected data at the New York TRACON, the
Newark ATCT (Air Traffic Control Tower), and the Continental ramp tower at Newark.
28
Weather and Restrictions
The national weather map in Figure 11 shows the national weather at 9:30:00 EDT (13:30:00
Zulu (GMT)). The key features that affected Newark were the front extending from the coast off Maine
down to Mississippi, and the front over Lake Eerie. The front from Maine to Mississippi moved east and
impacted Newark throughout the day, affecting primarily south and west departures. The front over Lake
Eerie also moved east and impacted the airport through the afternoon and evening, affecting primarily
northeast and west departures.
Figure 11. National Doppler radar map - 9:30:00 EDT (13:30:00 Zulu), Source: Data Transmission
Network.
The Gantt chart and local Doppler radar maps in Figure 12 to Figure 18 show the departure
restrictions from 7:15 EDT to 19:00 EDT, June 29, 2000. These are according to the logs collected from
the New York TRACON, and apply to all the traffic through the specified fixes, not only the traffic from
Newark. Superimposed on the Doppler radar maps are maps of New York ARTCC (Air Route Traffic
Control Center), with the primary departure fixes and their associated jet-routes. The colors of the fixes
and jet-routes correspond to the legend below the Gantt chart, as do the colors on the Gantt chart.
The initial restrictions applied are Historically Validated Restrictions (HVRs), which are based
on historical data regarding aircraft volume and not the weather forecast. By 10:00 EDT the HVRs were
lifted, except for that on BIGGY, which was closed briefly and then restricted to 40 MIT, because of
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downstream weather. By 13:00 EDT the front from the northwest had begun to impact northwest
departures, and 10 MIT restrictions were correspondingly applied to GAYEL and COATE. Because of
downstream weather BIGGY and LANNA were restricted to 40 MIT and WHITE was closed. By this
time the front to the south of the airport was moving off the coast of New Jersey. By 14:30 EDT, ELIOT
was also restricted, to 20 MIT, because of the local weather from the northwest. At 16:00 EDT the local
weather was impacting all north and west departure fixes, and COATE, all west fixes, and WHITE were
all closed. All the west fixes were opened by 16:50 EDT, before being closed again by 18:15. BIGGY
was then opened, and much of the westbound traffic re-routed through it.
The most significant observation from the study is the close correlation between the weather and
the restrictions applied. This is illustrated in Figure 19, which shows a simplified representation of the
restrictions in Figure 12 to Figure 18 alongside a representation of when local weather impacted the
corresponding jet-routes. The local weather and the restrictions correlate closely.
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Figure 12. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 7:15 EDT (11:15 Zulu).
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Figure 13. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 11:00 EDT (15:00 Zulu).
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Figure 14. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 13:00 EDT (17:00 Zulu).
31
EWR Departure Fix Restrictions
EDT 7 1 1 11 1 1 4 1 1 IS 17 18
Zulu Tim 9 1 41  1 1 1 2 21
GAYEL
COATE
ELIOT
PARKE
LANNA
BIGGY
WHITE
ZNY
Programs
EWR Departure Delays 15m-in
ATQliCimOMIT 15 MIT 20 MIT m 30 MIT
m 40 MIT M Stopped Reroute - APREQ
ZNY Programs SWAP - Hotline Activated
(Severe Weather Avoidance Plan)
North-east fixes unrestricted throughout day
Local Doppler Radar Map
14:58:36 EDT (18:5836 Zulu)
Source: Lincoln Laboratories ITWS
Figure 15. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 15:00 EDT (19:00 Zulu).
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Figure 16. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 16:15 EDT (21:15 Zulu).
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Figure 17. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 17:00 EDT (22:00 Zulu).
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Figure 18. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 19:00 EDT (23:00 Zulu).
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Figure 19. Simplified EWR departure restrictions and local weather - June 29, 2000.
Impact on Departure Delays
Departure delays were calculated as follows:
Departure Delay = Actual wheels off time - (Scheduled pushback time + 12 min average taxi time)
The 12 minute average taxi time is as recommended by Continental Airlines. This delay
definition is particularly useful because it includes both gate and taxi delays, regardless of whether they
were incurred under airline or FAA control. They are thus the delays actually felt by passengers.
Figure 20 shows a plot of the average departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from Newark
airport. This is a running plot, so as aircraft are delayed they progressively add more time to the presented
average delay, until they depart, at which point their delay no longer counts towards the average delay
presented.
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Figure 20. Running plot of average departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from Newark Airport.
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Examination of arrival delays into Newark on June 29, 2000 show particularly high arrival delays
around 13:00 EDT, as a result of the implementation of the Severe Weather Avoidance Program (SWAP)
which was active from 13:00 to 22:30 EDT. SWAP is an FAA delay program which blocks off large
chunks of airspace in regions where thunderstorms are reported. This explains the correspondingly higher
departure delays at 14:20 EDT. However, arrival delays were not unusually high after 14:30 EDT,
suggesting that the increase in departure delays from 15:00 EDT were the result of other effects. The data
presented in Figure 20 can be multiplied by a similar running count of the number of aircraft waiting to
depart from the airport, shown in Figure 21. This yields a running plot of the total departure delay of
aircraft waiting to depart from the airport. This is presented in Figure 22. Again, as aircraft are delayed
they progressively add more time to the presented delay, until they depart, at which point their delay no
longer counts towards the delay presented.
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Figure 21. Running plot of number of aircraft waiting to depart from Newark Airport, June 29, 2000.
Figure 22 effectively shows a measure of the total frustration of passengers, as it accumulates the
delays of all the aircraft waiting to depart. The plot is also progressive, and can thus be compared to the
Gantt charts of restrictions presented in Figure 19. Thus the correlation between the delays and the
restrictions can be examined. It is clear that delays start to climb precisely when there are fix closures in
all three directions, just before 16:00 EDT. This particularly coincides with the fix closures to the west. It
is then also clear that it is when the fix closures are lifted that the delays start to decrease again at 20:00.
Again, at 21:30, when there are again fix closures to the west, delays climb again, until just before 22:00
when the west closures are lifted. The correlation between the fix closures and the delays is very clear.
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Figure 22. Running plot of total departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from Newark Airport.
Comparison to a Day not impacted by Adverse Weather
In order to calibrate the degree to which it was the downstream constraints that caused the delays
at the airport, data from a second day when there was no adverse weather impacting Newark, was
processed for comparison with the data from June 29, 2000 (Figure 22). By examination of the FAA's
CODAS database (Consolidated Operations and Delay Analysis System), and of NEXRAD (NEXt
generation weather RADar) national mosaic reflectivity images of the United States, Tuesday, August 22,
2000 was identified to have little weather impacting Newark. This day was also during the working week,
ensuring a schedule density comparable to that of June 29, 2000. A national mosaic reflectivity image of
the US for this day can be seen in Figure 23. There is clearly very little weather on the East Coast, and
none near New York City. This was the case throughout the day.
Figure 23. NEXRAD National Mosaic Reflectivity Images - August 22, 2000, 9:00:00 EDT (13:00:00
Zulu), Source: NEXRAD. [15]
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Figure 24 shows a running plot of the average departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from
the airport on August 22, 20000, alongside that for June 29, 2000 (from Figure 20). Comparing these it is
clear that average delays were significantly lower on August 22, than on June 29. The average delays on
June 29, 2000, from 11:00 to 16:00 EDT are actually comparable to the average delays on August 22,
2000, from 18:00 to 23:00 EDT. This suggests that the average delays on June 29, 2000, before 16:00
EDT, were not more severe than normal. It was only when the front from the northwest closed the west
and north fixes, with the south fixes already closed from the front to the south, that average delays
increased significantly above that of normal conditions.
140-
120-
100-
80-
60
40
20-
0-
11:00
Aug 22, 2000
12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00
Time (EDT)
140-
120-
100-
80
60
40
20-
0-
0:00
June 29, 2000
11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00
Time (EDT)
Figure 24. Running plots of average departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from Newark Airport,
August 22, 2000 (upper) and June 29, 2000 (lower).
Figure 25 shows a running plot of the total departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from the
airport on August 22, 20000, alongside that for June 29, 2000 (from Figure 22). Comparing these it is
clear that delays on August 22, 2000 were significantly less than those of June 29, 2000. The difference
between the two days in that the adverse weather of June 29, 2000 was not present on August 22, 2000,
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suggesting that it is the downstream constraints identified on June 29, 2000, that caused the severe delays
on that day.
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Figure 25. Running plot of total departure delay of aircraft waiting to depart from Newark Airport,
August 22, 2000.
1.3.4 Key Conclusions
The key conclusion drawn from the site visit on June 29, 2000 is that downstream airspace
capacity limitations were a primary flow constraint and the primary cause of surface delays. Weather was
clearly the primary cause of the restrictions, seen by the correspondence between the local weather and
the restrictions applied. The propagation of these external constraints to the airport surface was observed
in the increase in departure delays coinciding closely with those periods when restrictions were most
severe.
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CHAPTER 2: ATC RESPONSE TO DELAYS
2.1 INTRODUCTION To ATC RESPONSE
Pressure from both the public and from congress has forced the FAA to respond to the severe
airport delays in the NAS. FAA Administrator Jane Garvey has spoken about ATC delays and capacity
before congress a number of times, including a statement specifically dedicated to air traffic congestion
in the New York Metroplex, on July 16, 2001 when testifying before the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation [16]. Correspondingly, ATC has responded to the delays at
Newark in a number of ways. These are discussed in detail in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
2.2 TACTICAL ATC RESPONSES
Tactical responses are those responses performed on a day-to-day basis when delays develop at
the airport, as opposed to strategic responses, which are performed once, to prevent the delays from
developing at all. Tactical responses to airport delays, by ATC, include:
. The application of restrictions to fixes or jet-routes;
. Re-routing of aircraft, and the utilization of the National Playbook for formulation of re-routes;
. Utilization of decision aiding software such as the Departure Spacing Program (DSP) and the
Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS), for improved ATC decision-making.
Furthermore, the following responses have been questioned as to their potential to reduce delays:
. Improved inter-facility communication;
. Increased utilization of runway 11/29.
Each of these is discussed in detail in the sections following.
2.2.1 Fix Restrictions
The application of restrictions to fixes and jet-routes is the primary ATC response to adverse
weather. Limiting the number of aircraft using a specific fix or jet-route when that fix or jet-route is
impacted by weather is essential to ensuring the safety of the NAS. These restrictions result in delays at
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airports as demand exceeds capacity. Detailed observations were consequently made of the restrictions
applied to the primary departure fixes for Newark airport, on June 29, 2000.
Figure 26 shows the Gantt chart and local Doppler radar map at 11:00 EDT. The Doppler radar
map shows the weather moving east, off the coast. At this time it was no longer having a direct impact on
the southern west fixes, but continued to impact WHITE in the south. WHITE was correspondingly
restricted to 20 MIT. The HVRs were complete, leaving the north and northern west fixes unrestricted. A
20 MIT restriction had, however, been applied to PARKE and a 40 MIT restriction applied to BIGGY.
According to the Gantt chart this fix was also closed briefly, at 9:20 EDT. However, it is clear that
BIGGY was not impacted by local weather, so these restrictions must have been the result of capacity
constraints further away from the airport. Figure 27 shows the national weather over the destination cities
with preferred routings from Newark through BIGGY. These cities were clearly severely impacted by the
front extending from off the coast of New England down to the Gulf of Mexico. It is thus downstream
weather that is the cause of the restriction, and not local weather. This was also the case for PARKE and
LANNA, although LANNA remained unrestricted because the volume of traffic through this fix was
light.
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Figure 26. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 11:00 EDT (15:00 Zulu).
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Figure 27. National Doppler radar map - 10:30:00 EDT (14:30:00 Zulu), Source: Data Transmission
Network.
Figure 28 shows the Gantt chart and local Doppler radar map at 13:00 EDT. At this time the
weather to the south of the airport had continued to move off the coast, now no longer impacting WHITE
locally. However, the front originally over Lake Eerie had started to impact the north and northern west
fixes locally. The weather to the northwest of the airport, although somewhat sparse, was severe in
places. Consequently GAYEL and COATE had been restricted to 10 MIT. ELIOT and PARKE, the two
northern west fixes, were however unrestricted, despite local weather, and instead LANNA and BIGGY
were restricted, to 40 MIT. WHITE was also closed at this time, despite no local weather. As can be seen
in Figure 29 these restrictions were again caused by downstream weather severely impacting the majority
of destination cities for flights from Newark with preferred routings through these fixes. ELIOT and
PARKE, although impacted by local weather, were unrestricted because of light traffic (at 13:00 ELIOT
was accepting 5 aircraft per hour, and PARKE, 0 aircraft per hour). This suggests that it is not only the
weather that affects restrictions, but also the amount of traffic through the fixes. By 15:00 EDT the flow
rate on ELIOT had increased to 25 aircraft per hour, whilst PARKE remained low at 2 aircraft per hour.
Correspondingly ELIOT was restricted to 20 MIT by 15:00 EDT, whilst PARKE remained unrestricted.
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Figure 28. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 13:00 EDT (17:00 Zulu).
Figure 29. National Doppler radar map - 12:30:00 EDT (16:30:00 Zulu), Source: Data Transmission
Network.
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The severe weather avoidance plan (SWAP), also went active at 13:00 EDT. This was because of
the severe restrictions to the west, and the closure of WHITE, the primary southbound fix. At 15:00 EDT
the hotline, a direct and continuous telephone communication between all the facilities in the area, was
activated.
It is clear from the above discussion that it is not simply local weather that affects restrictions,
but rather a coupling of local weather, downstream weather, and traffic demand. Each of these factors
should thus be addressed in the development of tools designed to aid decision making in the
implementation of restrictions.
ATC Tower Response to Restrictions
The FAA ATCT reacts to restrictions by changing pushback times. This response was examined
by analyzing the departure rates from Newark airport, on June 29, 2000. Figure 30 shows the schedule as
filed by the airlines, with the changes made by the controllers in the ATCT overlaid in green and red.
Both departure rates were calculated using data transcribed from the flight strips collected on the site visit
to Newark on June 29, 2000. The rates apply to wheels off time, and not pushback time, assuming a
nominal taxi-time at Newark of 12 minutes (as used by Continental). The schedule filed by the airlines
includes all changes to the Official Airline Guide (OAG) schedule implemented by the airlines.
Cancellations are not included in either departure rate.
Departure rate [aircraftlhr]
120-
m Airline Modified Schedule
100- m Decreases in schedule
m Increases in schedule
80-
60-
40-
20-
0-
10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00
Time (EDT)
Figure 30. Airline filed and ATC departures rates, June 29, 2000.
There are few changes by ATC until 16:00 EDT, when there is a significant decrease in the ATC
modified rate, until 18:45 EDT. There is then a significant increase in the ATC modified rate from 20:30
to 22:45 EDT. These periods are indicated by the red ovals in the figure. Comparing this to Figure 31,
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which shows simplified departure restrictions, as in Figure 19, it is clear that the decrease in departure
rate coincides closely with that period when the fixes were closed.
Eastern DaylIghtTimel 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
North Restrictions
West Restrictions
South Restrictions
Restrictions Applied to Jet-route or Fix
Jet-route or Fix closed
Figure 31. Simplified EWR departure restrictions - June 29, 2000.
The effects of the departure queue operations, after the aircraft have been pushed back, can be
examined by comparing the ATC modified departure rate and the actual departure rate from Newark
airport, on June 29, 2000. This is presented in Figure 32. The ATC scheduled departure rate is that after
modification by both the airlines and ATC. Again both departure rates were calculated using data
transcribed from the collected flight strips; the rates apply to wheels off time; and cancellations are not
included.
Departure rate [aircraft/hr]
120 - ----- - -
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Time (EDT)
Figure 32. Scheduled and actual departure rates, June 29, 2000.
These two departure rates do not initially appear to coincide very closely. However, ignoring the
fluctuations below a period of about 30 minutes, the longer-term shape of the plots does coincide closely
throughout the day. The poor correspondence at the shorter period is because manpower issues do not
allow FAA controllers to modify the departure rates often enough to make them more accurate than
44
observed. The airlines and controllers also tend to schedule flights on the hour or half hour, whilst the
actual departure rate is directly affected by the dynamics of the fix restrictions and departure queue.
The longer-term shape of the ATC scheduled rate is affected by the banking structure used by the
airlines, and the rescheduling performed by the airlines and the FAA. The close correlation of the longer-
term ATC scheduled and actual departure rates suggests that the FAA and airline rescheduling was
successful in the longer term. However, because of manpower constraints, short-term restriction changes,
and the requirement for airlines to file final flight plans 45 minutes before scheduled pushback, the ability
of airlines and ATC to respond quicker is limited. This would however improve efficiency and reduce
delays.
Clearly the ATC scheduled rate is lowest from 16:00 through to 20:00 EDT. This is because of
the modifications by ATC seen in Figure 30. The actual departure rate is a direct function of the
restrictions, and particularly the longer term restrictions such as the lengthy fix closures to the west and
south. The longer term shape of the actual departure rate, like the sheduled departure rate, coincides
closely with the restrictions in Figure 31, as expected. The shorter term fluctuations do however mean
that improvements can be made and effiency improved. Decision aiding tools designed specifically to
improve short-term response in the ATCT may improve efficiency and thus allow more aircraft to depart
per hour, leading to a reduction in delays.
Conclusions
Restrictions are implemented by ATC, according to a coupling of local weather, downstream
weather, and traffic demand. The airport ATCTs then respond to these restrictions by rescheduling
departures in the longer-term, and by releasing aircraft to each fix at a rate consistent with the restrictions
on each fix in the short-term. Development of decision aiding tools to improve both the implementation
of the restrictions and the ATCT response to them would increase efficiency and reduce delays.
2.2.2 Re-routes
Re-routing aircraft from their original flight plan onto a new less restricted route is a preferred
method for dealing with severe fix or jet-route restrictions. The reason for this is that re-routes around
sections of the flight path that are severely restricted can reduce delays on routes that would otherwise be
severely delayed. Figure 33 illustrates two routes, with two components each - a fix or jet-route local to
the origin airport, and a downstream fix or jet-route. If the two routes were separate a local or
downstream constraint would stop the flow on that route. However, if re-routes between routes were
allowed, shown by the dashed lines, the local weather on one route would not impact the flow to the
destinations on that route, as aircraft could be re-routed onto the other route locally, and returned to their
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original route after the local constraint. Similarly if one route had local constraints and the other had
downstream constraints, flow on the route with downstream constraints could be lightly restricted, and
traffic from the route with local constraints re-routed onto it, before being re-routed back, after the local
constraints. If correctly planned, this could leave the level of traffic on the fix with downstream
constraints low enough to meet the restrictions required downstream.
Route 1 Route 2
Downstream Fix Downstream Fix
or Jet-route or Jet-route
Local Fix or Local Fix or
Jet-route Jet-route
Origin
Figure 33. Advantages of re-routing.
Despite its benefits, re-routing is difficult to implement, as all facilities affected need to agree on
the re-route, which is coordinated through the ATCSCC. This may often involve a number of facilities
with conflicting interests. Because of these difficulties the National Playbook was developed, which
provides pre-determined re-route suggestions for specific fix and jet-route closures. On November 15, 16
and 17, 2000, the Newark ATCT, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York TRACON,
and New York ARTCC, were visited and controllers interviewed. According to these interviews the
National Playbook is well respected and the re-routes implemented are generally taken directly from the
Playbook. During the June 29, 2000 site visit to Newark Airport, however, controllers did not use the
Playbook extensively. This was because plays did not exist for the weather scenarios that impacted the
airport that day. The Playbook can only be used for the specific weather scenarios in the book. A detailed
examination of those re-routes implemented follows.
Figure 28, which shows the restrictions and local Doppler radar map for 13:00 EDT, clearly
shows a gap between the two fronts, through which WHITE and J209 pass. This gap grows as the day
progresses. It appears initially that this gap could allow traffic to fly west by departing through WHITE
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and flying west around the south of the front coming through from the north west. However, this would
require that the aircraft change their flight plans from flying from New York Center to Cleveland Center,
to flying from New York Center to Washington Center, and then to Cleveland Center from the south.
Because this re-route crosses center boundaries it would have required extensive coordination between
the three Centers, through the ATCSCC. New York arrivals from the south also pass through this
corridor, and Washington arrivals and departures use the airspace just south of the front from the
northwest. The flights would be interacting with traffic to and from Washington Dulles (IAD),
Washington National (DCA), Baltimore (BWI) and Philadelphia (PHL). With improved inter-facility
coordination however, this gap in the weather may have been able to be utilized, allowing much traffic
out to the west.
Figure 34 shows the Gantt chart and local Doppler radar map at 16:15 EDT. The weather from
the northwest continued to move towards New York City, and can be seen to impact the north and west
departure fixes. Because of the local weather COATE and all the west fixes were closed. These were the
departure fixes with the highest traffic. WHITE remained closed because of downstream weather,
although some re-routes were allowed though the gap between the two fronts to Norfolk (ORF) and
Charlotte (CLT). The traffic to these destinations was however light in comparison to that scheduled
through the west fixes, and the original flights plans also took the flights through the same ARTCCs.
One of the plays in the National Playbook, called NO-WESTGATES/RBV__1 is designed for use
when all west departure fixes are closed. This play, however, re-routes aircraft through COATE and
WHITE, both of which were closed on June 29 when the west fixes were closed. This re-route was thus
unavailable. The only open fixes were those to the northeast. There is a play in the National Playbook
called TOP-THE-WX_1, which is a special request routing for "topping the weather", where west
departures fly through MERIT, to the northeast, in order to cut back to the north of the weather.
However, when the west fixes were closed on June 29, there was heavy traffic flying to Europe so these
fixes were also unavailable.
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Figure 34. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 16:15 EDT (21:15 Zulu).
Figure 35 shows the Gantt chart and local Doppler radar map at 19:00 EDT. Although ELIOT
and PARKE were closed by 7 pm, BIGGY was re-opened, and all westbound traffic was re-routed onto
that fix. This re-route is not however specified in the National Playbook. No play is described for the
closure of three of the four west fixes, although some plays for other closures do re-route traffic onto
BIGGY, such as the play for the closure ofjet-route J6 (NO-J6_3). The re-route of traffic onto BIGGY is
not likely to have required difficult coordination because the traffic continued to be westbound.
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Figure 35. Restrictions and local Doppler radar map - 19:00 EDT (23:00 Zulu).
Conclusions
The National Playbook can only be utilized for weather situations for which plays are developed,
and can thus only be utilized for a severe weather situation if a play is developed for that scenario. It is
thus essential that plays continue to be developed and the Playbook updated. Even the Playbook re-routes
can however be rendered un-usable by constraints on the destination fixes.
It is not clear to what degree inter-facility coordination would have had to be improved to have
allowed the re-route through the gap between the fronts, from 3pm to 5pm on June 29. It does appear
however that re-route opportunities would be greatly improved by more efficient inter-facility
coordination.
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2.2.3 Decision-Aiding Tools
A number of decision aiding tools have been developed to improve communication and
information flow in ATC. These include the Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS), General
Information (GI) Message System and Flight Data Information Operation (FDIO), Information Display
System-4 (IDS-4), the System Command Center Operations Information System (OIS) Website, Doppler
weather radar displays, Departure Spacing Program (DSP), and Integrated Terminal Weather System
(ITWS). DSP and ITWS particularly are two recently introduced decision-aiding tools designed
specifically as delay problems within the NAS have become a primary focus of the FAA.
DSP is a tool that uses dynamic air traffic information from specially adapted airports to schedule
flights though common departure fixes. This tool provides controllers and Traffic Management
Coordinators (TMCs) with the ability to space departing aircraft. However, the tool also improves
efficiency by reducing voice coordination between the ATCT, the TRACON and ARTCCs, and
providing a dynamic flight plan, ATC information, and reports. DSP also provides departure controllers
and TMCs with the aircraft ground lineup status for aircraft departing from each airport runway in the
system [17]. In April, 2000 DSP was installed at Newark, LaGuardia, JFK, and Philadelphia ATCTs;
New York and Philadelphia TRACONs; and New York ARTCC.
According to interviews carried out on November 17, 2000, DSP is a great benefit to the New
York Departure Pit (NYDP) Complex at the New York ARTCC, which issues departure clearances to
each departing aircraft. This is because DSP is able to check flight plans automatically according to
preferential departure routings, and thus enables NYDP controllers to issue clearances electronically,
doing away with flight strips in the NYDP. The tool was also described as useful for ensuring the
efficient utilization of open fixes and for coordination of aircraft departure times for better system
efficiency. However, it does not provide any assistance in optimizing routes or assignment of re-routes.
In contrast to its use at the ARTCC, according to interviews on November 16, 2000 DSP is not used
extensively at the New York TRACON. The tool was described as powerful but requiring more airports
to be truly useful to the TRACON.
ITWS is a system that is designed to provide safety and planning tools to all terminal aviation
system users, by providing improved weather information. The system was developed initially by MIT
Lincoln Laboratories, and further by Raytheon and TRW. It is designed to characterize current terminal
weather situations and forecast 30 minutes into the future, presenting the data on a Doppler radar map.
ITWS includes wind shear and microburst predictions, storm cell and lightning information, terminal area
winds aloft, runway winds, and short-term ceiling and visibility predictions. The ITWS demonstration
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system was introduced in New York in the fall of 1998, and its capability extended to include 30 minute
predictions of convective storms in the summer of 1999. The system is currently operational at Newark,
Teterboro, LaGuardia and JFK ATCTs; the New York TRACON; New York, Boston and Washington
ARTCCs; and the ARTCSCC in Herndon, VA. American, Continental, Delta, Federal Express,
Northwest, Southwest, United, UPS and US Airways also either have access to the situation display or
Internet access to ITWS.
According to interviews on the June 29, 2000 site visit, a visit to the Newark ATCT, New York
TRACON and New York ARTCC on November 15-17, 2000, and a visit to Continental at Newark June
14 and 15, 2001, ITWS has been well received and is used routinely. However, as ITWS only
characterizes the terminal area, controllers expressed a desire to also see ITWS applied further a field
than the Terminal Area. National weather maps from the Internet are thus generally used in conjunction
with ITWS. Despite this, according to a study by Lincoln Laboratories [7] ITWS provides an annual
delay reduction of over 49,000 hours, which has a monetary value of over $150,000,000 per year. The
study also shows that delays could be further reduced if ITWS were extended to provide prediction of
thunderstorm decay, and the onset and ending of capacity limiting events such as low ceiling or high
surface winds.
Conclusions
Both DSP and ITWS appear to have been successful in improving decision aiding within ATC
operations. Both can however be further developed, including the inclusion of more airports in the DSP
system, and the extension of ITWS to include weather further a field. It is also recommended that the
integration of both tools with other decision aiding tools be considered, so as to maximize their
effectiveness and benefit to the system.
2.2.4 Communication
Another way in which delays can be reduced is by increasing the efficiency of strategic
communication and coordination within the air traffic control system. Strategic communication and
coordination has been recognized as a critical area in which system efficiency can be improved, leading
to the development of the Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) initiative, developed to improve
communication between ATC facilities and the airlines. The initial prototype operation was implemented
in January 1998, at Newark and San Francisco, and it was expended to all airports in September 1998.
This initiative has lead to traffic management tools that aim to increase information sharing between
parties whilst reducing the requirements for coordination. The traffic management tools developed
through this initiate have been effective at improving communication between ATC and the airlines, but
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according to Davison and Hansman [18] the effectiveness of the CDM initiatives can be further enhanced
by their application to the ATC system internally, particularly to inter-facility communications. Davison
and Hansman identify a number of emergent themes, including an ambiguous organizational structure,
information flow issues, awkward and unorganized communications and coordination, and organizational
cultural issues. A number of recommendations are made including further centralization of authority to
the ATCSCC; proceduralization of the communication of new or revised restrictions; proceduralization
of commonly used re-routes; and restructuring teleconferences and hotlines.
2.2.5 Utilization of Runway 11-29
Runway 11-29 is the third runway at Newark airport, after the parallel runways. This runway has
limited utilization and more use would definitely add capacity. However there are significant limitations
to the runway's use. Firstly, there are complications resulting from operations on the runway interacting
with arrivals and departures to and from the other airports in the area, particularly LaGuardia and
Teterboro airports. Secondly, there are also limitations on the types of aircraft able to depart on the
runway, because of its length. The runway is only 6,800 ft long. Assuming sea level performance,
standard conditions, maximum take off weight, and a dry runway surface, the only aircraft operated by
Continental able to depart from the runway are the Boeing 737-700, the Embraer ERJ135, the Embraer
EMB 120 and the Aerospatiale ATR 42-320. This means that many of the aircraft operated at the airport
cannot use the runway, and must instead operate from the parallel runways. Continental airlines are also
converting from using turboprop aircraft such as the ATR 42-320, to using regional jets, such as the
ERJ135 and ERJ145 (which cannot depart from runway 11-29). The result is further reduced utilization
of runway 11-29, and increased use of the already congested parallel runways.
Operations are also limited by interactions with the two parallel runways at Newark, introduced
with the extension of the parallel runways to cross runway 11-29. Simultaneous operations of runway 11-
29 and runway 22R have subsequently been restricted [19]. Arrivals on the runway are also affected by
the requirement to use LAHSO (Land and Hold Operations) in order to hold short of runway 4L-22R. At
the time of the runway extension pilot unions contended that the FAA had not done enough to ensure that
LAHSO was safe and had recommended that their members refuse to use the procedure. Consequently
LAHSO had received bad press and added to the reduced utilization of the runway 11-29.
It is recommended that steps be taken to improve coordination with Teterboro and LaGuardia, so
as to allow increased utilization of the runway. Particularly, the New York airspace redesign should also
take this factor into account.
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2.3 STRATEGIC ATC RESPONSES
Strategic responses are those responses that are acted upon once, to prevent delays from
developing at all, and change the way the system operates, as opposed to a tactical response, which is
performed on a day-to-day basis when delays develop. The consequences of a strategic response are seen
on a day-to-day basis.
Strategic responses by ATC include the development of the Air Traffic Control System
Command Center (ATCSCC) in Herndon, VA, and the redesign of the New York airspace.
2.3.1 Air Traffic Control System Command Center
The role of the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) is to manage the flow of
approximately 50,000 aircraft operations per day within the continental United States. The facility strives
to balance air traffic demand with system capacity and safety, and has been operational since 1994. The
formation of the ATCSCC, and the CDM initiative, which began in 1998, lead to a change in the
organizational structure of the ATC system. The primary change was from a decentralized structure to a
more centralized structure, with authority centralized to the ATCSCC. As identified by Davison and
Hansman [18], the ATC system has aspects of a centralized hierarchical structure at the national level, in
that the ATCSCC's responsibility is to maintain efficiency throughout the other ATC facilities. However,
each ATC facility ultimately still functions autonomously, without being under the authority of the
ATCSCC, revealing a more decentralized structure at the local level. This creates ambiguity in the
organizational structure, which affects coordination at the local level. [18]. As identified by Davison and
Hansman [18], further centralization of authority to the ATCSCC would reduce the ambiguity of the
organizational structure. However it would also relinquish flexibility at the local level.
2.3.2 New York Airspace Redesign
The New York airspace redesign is part of the FAA's National Airspace System Operational
Evolution Plan, which calls for changes in how aircraft operate to better match available capacity to meet
demand. The Operational Evolution Plan intends to identify solutions to increase terminal throughput; to
reduce en-route congestion by increasing flexibility; to keep terminal throughput closer to visual levels in
all weather conditions; and to increase flexibility to cope with en route severe weather [20]. The objective
to increase terminal throughput includes redesigns of a number of terminal areas in the United States,
including that of New York and Philadelphia.
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The New York airspace redesign is still in its development stages. However, according to
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Aviation Rep. John Mica, speaking after a congressional
hearing looking at ways to alleviate congestion at New York City airports on July 16, 2001, the FAA's
airspace redesign program is a top priority to cut down on delays, particularly at LaGuardia. According to
FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, who spoke at the same hearing, the redesign will not be completed until
late 2005 or early 2006. [21]
Purpose
The purpose of the New York airspace redesign is to identify ways to increase the efficiency of
air traffic flows into and out of the metropolitan area, including Philadelphia, whilst still maintaining or
improving the level of safety and air traffic services that are currently in place. This is necessary to
respond to the increased demand for air travel, which requires increased system reliability, and thus a
reduction in delays. Some of the direct results of the redesign will be reduced delays at major airports,
reduced pilot and controller workload, enhanced safety, and reduced adverse environmental impacts such
as noise and air emissions. [22]
Redesign Process
According to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, all federal agencies are
required to determine the impacts of any major action on the environment, prior to the implementation of
the project. In compliance with the act all federal agencies and organizations in the United States must
complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine the
environmental impact of the projects under consideration.
In the development of the EIS the FAA carried out pre-scoping workshops with the public at 31
different locations around New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia. The purpose of these workshops
were to increase the partnership with selected officials and the public in the very early stages of the
redesign, expand the design options based on the public input, increase understanding of critical public
issues that will need to be addressed in the redesign, improve public understanding of the project and its
goals, and to develop a more comprehensive project.
After the pre-scoping workshops the FAA used the input in the formal airspace redesign process.
This involved development of basic concepts, computer modeling, and eventually the development of
alternatives for evaluation. Four alternatives were developed, and are presented in more detail below. In
the draft EIS, the FAA describes the baseline environmental conditions and also analyzes environmental
impacts of this baseline associated with each of the alternatives considered. However in the final EIS the
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FAA are to select a preferred alternative and describe any mitigation efforts that would reduce the
impacts associated with the alternative chosen. [22]
Concepts
The airspace redesign is particularly complicated in the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
region because of the proximity of the four commercial service airports, which leads to an airspace that is
very complicated with respect to ingress and egress routes, and is also highly congested.
The redesign is to incorporate a number of strategies already developed to reduce congestion and
environmental effects. These include:
" Increasing the altitude of flights, keeping them higher for longer. This would include both higher
altitude arrivals and faster climb to altitude for departures.
" Where possible aircraft are to be either dispersed or concentrated over highways, industrial areas, and
other less noise sensitive areas. This is to reduce the noise influences on the community.
" Make use of advanced navigation tools to enable the above strategies and to reduce conversations
between the pilot and controller.
" Reduce flying time.
Four alternative concepts were proposed for the redesign, as follows. These are described
according to an interview in January 2001 with Mike Sammartino, Manager, Airspace Branch, Eastern
Region Air Traffic Division, FAA.
1. Modify the current system, without redesigning it from the ground up.
2. White paper approach - complete redesign, keeping only the runways.
3. A hybrid between the white paper approach and the current system
4. Use of the ocean for the majority of departures.
The alternative of modification of the current system would incorporate the strategies identified
above, but little more. Particularly this alternative would involve use of the improvements in airplane
design, including higher altitude arrivals and faster climb to altitude for departures. This alternative
would also make extensive use of flight paths over waterways.
The white paper concept is a complete redesign of the system from the ground up, leaving only
the runways. The new system structure would be likely to be similar to the four corner concepts at
Chicago O'Hare (ORD), Atlanta (ATL), Denver (DEN), and Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW). This structure
uses the four corner points for arrivals, with departures flowing out between the corners. Unlike the
current structure in New York and Philadelphia, which treats each airport separately, the new structure
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would treat the entire region as a single airport, until defined points within the airspace at which point the
aircraft would be separated to their respective airports. Particularly in the case of arrivals, the new
structure would treat the entire region as a single airport until a point 20 miles from New York, at which
point the aircraft would be split up to its respective destination airports. This means that if one arrival
route were particularly busy aircraft could simply be offloaded onto other arrival routes, regardless of
their destination airport. The current system does not allow for this, as arrivals are restricted to the routes
for their respective airports. The interaction within the 20 mile radius of New York is likely to be
complicated and will need careful development.
The hybrid approach is a combination of the above two alternatives, where some of the current
structures would be utilized, but there would still be extensive redesign.
The final approach is to send departures specifically out over the ocean, from all the region's
airports. This alternative is fairly simple in terms of its design, but is complicated politically. It is strongly
supported by some communities of New Jersey, as it would mean that there would be far fewer flights
over these cities. It is not however as popular with some other communities.
Conclusions and Recommendations
As stated by Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Aviation Rep. John Mica the New York
airspace redesign, as part of the FAA's National Airspace System Operational Evolution Plan, is to be the
top priority to cut down on delays [21] in the New York area. It is likely to be the most significant change
to the air traffic control system structure, and is also thought to be the most likely to achieve significant
reductions in delays. This is however very dependent on the solution chosen, and the ability of the
redesign process to avoid bureaucratic inertia, such as would occur by attempting to completely satisfy all
of the stakeholders, many of whom have contradicting interests.
2.3.3 Other Strategic Solutions
Newark is constrained by the limited number of runways it operates. The addition of a new
runway, however, is not a feasible solution at this time. Any new runway would need to be built
alongside the parallel runways, but sufficiently far from them as to allow for simultaneous operations.
This would however require the new runway to be built where Interstate 1-95 is currently located, and it is
not considered feasible to move this interstate because of the presence of the Newark harbor to its east.
Newark is thus not likely to develop a new runway in the foreseeable future.
Demand management has also been proposed as a solution to reduce congestion at the airport.
Currently Newark operates slot control at Terminal B only. According to interviews with Susan Baer,
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General Manager at Newark International and Teterboro Airports for the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, on November 15, 2000, further slot control is being considered, as is peak hour pricing. No
further steps have yet been taken in this regard, however.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In 2000 Newark airport had the highest ATC delays in the country, and was second only to
LaGuardia in percentage of operations delayed. The cause of delays at Newark was primarily weather,
with 84% of arrival delays related in some way to weather. The weather's impact on the airport is related
to the sensitivity of the airport to adverse weather and the frequency of adverse weather. Newark also
operates a very full, flat schedule, with few recovery periods, and is highly congested, Newark being one
of four primary airports in the New York Metroplex. According to a site visit to the airport on June 29,
2000, the primary flow constraint, which leads to the high surface delays at the airport, is downstream
airspace capacity limitations.
ATC Responses to the delays at Newark have been both tactical and strategic. Tactical responses
include application of restrictions and reroutes, and the use of decisions aiding tools. Other suggested
responses include improved inter-facility communication and increased utilization of runway 11-29.
Strategic responses to delays in the system include the formation of the ATCSCC, and a redesign of the
NAS. A number of conclusions related to these responses were identified, as described below.
Restrictions are implemented not only because of local weather, but are also affected by
downstream weather and traffic levels through the departure fixes. It is recommended that ATC decisions
aiding tools be developed that account for all of these factors. Integration with current systems such as
ITWS and DSP is also essential. It is also essential for decision aiding tools to be developed to improve
particularly the short-term efficiency of ATCT departure operations.
Dynamic re-routing is difficult because of the need for all the facilities to be in agreement for a
re-route to be approved. With improved inter-facility communication re-routing could thus be utilized to
a greater extent, and thus delays reduced. It is thus recommended that steps be taken particularly to
improve inter-facility communication, which may include the further development of decision aiding and
communication tools. The National Playbook, developed to suggest re-routes and improve their
utilization, although useful, needs to be further developed to include more plays. These would address
combinations of fix closures not addressed in the current edition of the playbook.
Two decision-aiding tools, DSP and ITWS, have recently been implemented at Newark and its
associated ATC facilities. DSP is a great benefit to the NYDP at the New York ARTCC and is useful for
ensuring efficient use of fixes, but was not used much by the New York TRACON as it did not include
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enough airports to be truly useful. It is thus recommended that DSP be further developed to include more
airports. ITWS has been well received and is used routinely. According to a study by Lincoln
Laboratories [7] it is responsible for an annual delay reduction of over 49,000 hours. However controllers
expressed a desire to see the system applied further a field as well as within the Terminal Area. It is thus
recommended that the system be extended to include weather further a field. It is also recommended that
the integration of both DSP and ITWS with other decision aiding tools be considered in detail.
Because of the competitive nature of the industry in which decisions aiding tools are developed it
may be necessary for some government intervention to allow efficient integration of the decision aiding
tools developed. It is essential that the tools developed integrate well as simply increasing the number of
tools available to controllers is likely to overload them and increase their tasks instead of decreasing
them. Instead the systems developed needs to be highly integrated, operating together with a minimum of
interfaces to controllers. This may require certain information about system design to be made available
to other contractors, when this information would normally be withheld for competitive reasons.
According to the study by Davison and Hansman on communication and coordination issues in
the NAS [18] the organizational structure is ambiguous. The formation of the ATCSCC has led to a ,
centralized control structure, with authority centralized to the ATCSCC. However, each ATC facility
ultimately still functions autonomously, revealing a more decentralized structure at the local level. As
identified by Davison and Hansman, further centralization of authority to the ATCSCC would reduce the
ambiguity of the organizational structure. A number of other themes are visible, such as information flow
issues, awkward and unorganized communications and coordination, and organizational cultural issues.
Increased utilization of runway 11-29 would add capacity, but it is significantly limited by
operational interaction issues with particularly Teterboro and LaGuardia; its length, with many aircraft
types not able to operate on the runway; and operational issues related to crossing the parallel runways. It
is particularly recommended that efforts be taken within the system to improve coordination with
Teterboro and LaGuardia to allow increased utilization of the runway. However, this should also be
addressed in detail in the re-design of the New York airspace. This may require the introduction of new
FAA procedures between the three airports.
The New York airspace redesign, part of the FAA's National Airspace System Operational
Evolution Plan, is a top priority to alleviate congestion at the New York airports. It is thus thought to be
the response to delays likely to have the greatest impact on reducing delays in the New York Metroplex,
and at Newark airport. The careful development of the New York airspace redesign is thus essential.
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CHAPTER 3: AIRLINE RESPONSE TO DELAYS
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE RESPONSE
The airline response to delays is of key importance because it is the airlines that suffer the
consequences of the passenger's dissatisfaction when flights are delayed or cancelled. They must
consequently not only take measures to reduce delays but also take measures to accommodate passengers
and make the delays that occur as painless as possible. This is particularly true at Newark where the
delays are primarily caused by adverse weather, which is out of the control of the airline.
Both the tactical and strategic airline responses to delays at Newark are discussed in detail in the
following sections. Because Continental Airlines is the dominant operator at the airport the discussion
focuses on responses by Continental.
3.2 TACTICAL AIRLINE RESPONSES
Tactical responses by the airlines include:
. Adjustment of scheduled departure time.
. Prioritized cancellations.
. Advanced ground control, including pre-sequencing for the departure queue.
. Extended accommodation of passengers.
. Improved access to information, for better prediction and understanding of delays.
3.2.1 Adjustment of Scheduled Departure Time
Apart from simply allowing a delayed departure to wait at the gate or in the departure queue, an
airline can modify its departure time, re-file its flight plan, or cancel the flight. Changing the scheduled
departure time is the simplest and most common response. A flight plan is generally re-filed only if
changes are made to the route by which the aircraft is to reach its destination, which is generally
considered to be the responsibility of the FAA, and not the airline. Cancellations are generally avoided
because it is so disrupting to passengers.
Airline modification of a flight's departure time and re-filing of its flight plan must be done a
minimum if 45 minutes before the original scheduled departure time. Modification of the departure time
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can best be examined by comparing the departure rate as predicted by the OAG schedule with the
departure rate after modifications by the airlines, i.e. before it is modified again by ATC.
Observations from Site Visit, June 29, 2000
Detailed observations were made of the departure rate from the airport on June 29, 2000, at
Newark airport. Figure 36 shows the scheduled departure rate from the airport according to the OAG,
with the changes made when the flight plans were filed by the airlines shown in green and red. These
departure rates were calculated from the data transcribed from the flight strips collected on the site visit,
and apply to wheels off time, and not pushback time. This schedule is the final schedule filed in the flight
plans, whereas the OAG schedule is published at the beginning of every month. The schedule is still to be
modified by ATC before take off. Cancelled flights are not included in either departure rate, so all the
differences between the two rates must be accounted to re-scheduling by the airlines.
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Figure 36. Airline OAG and filed departure rates, June 29, 2000.
There are clearly few changes to the original OAG departure rate, suggesting that the airlines do
little rescheduling, even when restrictions and delays are severe. The most significant change is a
consistent slight decrease in the departure rate from 15:00 to 19:30, and a corresponding increase from
19:30 to 22:30. This is shown in Figure 36 by the red ovals. Comparing this to Figure 37, which shows
simplified departure restrictions, it is clear that the decrease in departure rate coincides with that period
when the fixes were closed.
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Figure 37. Simplified EWR departure restrictions - June 29, 2000.
Conclusions
The very limited airline re-scheduling observed is related to the requirement for the new flight
plan to be submitted 45 minutes in advance of the specified pushback time, thus limiting its tactical
usefulness. It is thus recommended that this limit be re-evaluated and reduced to the extent possible. As
with re-routing, a desire not to infringe on the responsibility of the FAA is also thought to limit this type
of response. It is thus recommended that guidelines be laid down clarifying the role of ATC and the
airlines for re-scheduling and re-routing. This information would also be useful in the development of a
decision-aiding tool that aids the airlines in re-scheduling and re-routing before the 45 minute cutoff time.
3.2.2 Prioritized Cancellations
If a flight is to be delayed another response is to cancel the flight. This is however a drastic
measure, and is traditionally a choice of last resort. However, when severe delays are expected, advance
cancellation of low priority flights can significantly reduce delays of higher priority flights. According to
interviews with Continental Airlines at Newark on June 14, 2001, higher priority flights include
international flights, transcontinental flights, flights to hubs, and high load factor flights. Low priority
flights are generally shorter haul spoke flights.
Observations from Site Visit, June 29, 2000
Continental Airlines, including Continental Express, canceled a number of aircraft on June 29,
2000 because of the high delays and severe departure restrictions from Newark. The number of cancelled
aircraft per 15 minute interval is presented in Figure 38. It is clear that the greatest number of
cancellations were for aircraft scheduled to depart between the times 15:00 to 19:00. This coincides with
that period when restrictions and fix closures were most severe, evident in Figure 37.
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Figure 38. Number of aircraft cancelled by Continental Airlines, including Continental Express, June 29,
2000.
In order to examine the strategy behind the cancellations the number of cancelled flights was
plotted against origin-destination (0-D) flight distances, which is presented in Figure 39. It is clear from
the chart that the majority of cancellations are the shorter haul flights, with progressively fewer
cancellations as the flight distance increases. According to interviews with at Newark on June 14, 2001
Continental started to apply this strategy on May 10, 2000, when passengers displaced from a cancelled
short haul flight were sent to their destination by train. This is practical if the travel time by rail is of the
same order of magnitude as the flight time would have been if the flight were delayed instead of being
cancelled, so short haul passengers are not severely impacted. As a result of the success of this operation
Continental has entered into an agreement with Amtrak allowing passengers from cancelled short haul
flights to be sent to their destination by rail. Continental has also been operating buses with Continental
flight numbers to Lehigh Valley International Airport in Allentown, Pennsylvania (ABE) since 1997. It is
impractical however to use trains or buses to replace cancelled longer haul flights. Thus, Continental
Express flights are often cancelled in favor of longer haul Continental Airlines flights. Continental is
continuing to work with Amtrak to make this operation smoother.
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Figure 39. Number of Continental cancellations by origin-destination distance.
Conclusions
The response to the severe restrictions and delays at the airport on June 29, 2000 by canceling
flights was clearly far greater than by re-scheduling, as described in section 3.2.1. Specifically it was
observed that Continental uses a type of "pawn strategy" where short haul, low priority flights are
sacrificed to reduce delays for longer haul, higher priority flights. This strategy is supported by
cooperative agreements with Amtrak reducing the impact of the cancellation as the passengers still get to
there destination, by rail or road. The strategy reduces congestion, making it attractive to all stakeholders.
3.2.3 Advanced Ground Control
Continental Airlines controls much of the ramp area near terminal C, and during the extended
ramp operations Continental is given control of more taxiways. This allows the Continental ramp tower
to manipulate the sequence of its Continental departures in such a way as to help ATC, and thus reduce
delays. This is termed pre-sequencing or staging. Aircraft are sequenced according to which departure fix
they are scheduled to take off through, and according to the departure restrictions in place. Thus aircraft
scheduled to depart through the same departure fix are spaced in the departure sequence such that they
are available to the FAA precisely when they require aircraft for that particular fix. If a fix is closed the
aircraft scheduled to depart through that fix can be pulled out of the sequence and sent to a parking area
to await either a re-route or the opening of the fix.
One of the consequences of pre-sequencing by Continental is that when the FAA requires an
aircraft to a particular fix, it is inevitably a flight that Continental has pre-sequenced that is available first.
This improves the efficiency of the departure process for those flights that are pre-sequenced, but, it is
argued, reduces the efficiency of the departure process for those flights not pre-sequenced. This is the
argument of operators on the airport's south ramp.
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The benefit of pre-sequencing can be examined by comparing the delays of Continental flights
and those of other domestic carriers. International flights are ignored as they are given priority by the
FAA, and are thus unaffected by pre-sequencing. These delays, for the site visit on June 29, 2000, are
presented in Figure 40. This figure shows a running plot of the average departure delays of aircraft
waiting to depart from Newark. There is clearly an initial peak in Continental delays from 13:30 to 14:30.
Through examination of a running plot of the average arrival delays of Continental aircraft at Newark, the
cause of this peak is identified as high arrival delays from 12:30 to 14:30, thought to be induced by the
pending implementation of the Severe Weather Avoidance Program (SWAP), which was implemented at
13:00. These high arrival delays were restricted to Continental aircraft only because the other airlines had
no flights at this time. The steady climb in average departure delays from 15:00 is not however thought to
be because of arrival delays, as the arrival delays at this time were not high. This period instead coincides
directly with the most severe fix closures, seen in Figure 31, suggesting that they were a direct result of
external constraints. From 17:30 through to 22:00 Continental delays are consistently lower than those of
the other domestic carriers. This coincides with the most severe fix restrictions, shown in Figure 31,
which is when the Continental pre-sequencing is likely to have its greatest benefits.
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Figure 40. Running plot of average departure delay of flights waiting to depart from EWR.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The pre-sequencing employed by Continental does appear to reduce Continental delays when the
airport is impacted by adverse weather, but is also suspected to increase the delays of those flights not
pre-sequenced. It is thus recommended that the operators on the south ramp cooperate to also pre-
sequence flights. This would require the development of a ramp tower for the south ramp, which would
need to be coordinated with all the operators on the south ramp. An agreement for a new extended ramp
area may also have to be developed with the FAA, and the south ramp tower would then have to
coordinate with the Continental ramp tower to further optimize the FAA departure operations.
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3.2.4 Extended Accommodations of Passengers
Because of the increase in number and severity of delays in the NAS passenger frustration and
aggressive behavior has increased. Since Newark has particularly severe and frequent delays, Continental
Airlines has sought to reduce passenger frustration in a number of ways, including:
. Giving higher priority to arrivals, to reduce taxi-in delays. This means however that departures are
pushed earlier than they otherwise would, to free up gates for incoming arrivals. Thus although
arrival delays are reduced, departures must be pushed back even when they are to be severely
delayed in the departure queue. In many instances, it would be better for passengers to remain at
the gate.
. Developing the Continental Passenger Recovery (CPR) plan, which sets up procedures for
deplaning when arrivals do not have access to a gate. Deplaning is done at the UPS facility on the
south ramp, if the arrival lands on runway 22L, and at the Continental de-icing tent if it lands on
runway 4R. Passengers are then bused to the terminal. This means that if arrivals are delayed, and
it is impossible for a gate to be made available, passengers can still deplane.
. Updating passengers every 15 minutes on the flight status and likely delay length, during gate
delays. This keeps passengers informed, and gives them the opportunity to decide against flying if
they desire to.
. Introducing plasma screens in the terminals, showing convective weather maps, which allows
passengers to see the weather that is causing their delays.
. On location galley and lavatory servicing, watering of animals, and crew changing for severely
delayed aircraft holding in parking areas.
Continental is clearly taking a number of steps to minimize the discomfort of delays. This is a
very visible gesture to passengers that the airline recognizes that there is a problem with delays and that it
is working to solve it.
3.2.5 Information Availability
The Continental ramp tower is equipped with a number of tools to enable it to respond to delays
quickly. These include:
. The Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS).
. Weather Services International (WSI) weather forecasting.
. Access to ATCT radio frequencies.
. Hotline to the FAA ATCT.
. Access to the Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS).
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The Continental operations center also has access to information, including:
- Updates on all active ground delay programs.
. Continental managers at Newark are able to listen into the daily strategic planning teleconference
between the region's ATC facilities.
. Continental managers are also able to listen into the FAA's full time hotline between the region's
ATC facilities operational during heavy system congestion.
The information available to Continental, and specifically in its ramp tower and through the
strategic planning teleconference and the hotline during heavy system congestion, have provided
Continental with a better understanding of the restrictions impacting the airport, and have thus enabled it
to respond to them more efficiently, such as through pre-sequencing of its departures. It is however
recommended that the Continental evaluate and then adjust its operational structure to ensure full
utilization of the information from these tools.
3.3 STRATEGIC RESPONSES To DELAYS
Strategic responses by the airlines at Newark airport include:
. Decrease in operations.
. Changes to the Continental fleet.
. Changes to the schedule operated at Newark.
. Changes to Continental's ground operations.
. Improvement of Continental's relationship with the FAA and PANYNJ.
. Development of a relationship between Continental Airlines and Amtrak.
. New Continental facilities at the airport.
3.3.1 Decrease in Operations
Because Newark airport is not slot controlled, airlines are free to operate as many flights from the
airport as desired. Because of "the problem of the commons" however competition leads to over
utilization of the airport, and more flights are scheduled than can be efficiently accommodated by the
airport. This leads to delays. When an airline dominates an airport however, cooperation to reduce the
total number of operations, and thus delays, is easier. Because Continental operates 55% of flights at
Newark, the system wide growth in operations has been avoided at Newark, and operations have in fact
been reduced. It is clear in Figure 41, which shows total operations at Newark, according to the FAA
OPSNET database, that there is a small but steady reduction in operations from 1997 to 2000.
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Fige 41. Total Operations at Newark, alongside average arrival and departure delays.
Average arrival and departure delays, plotted alongside the total operations in Figure 41, can be
seen to have leveled out since this time, after the peak in delays in 1996 caused by particularly poor
weather that year. The response by the airlines to reduce operations has clearly been effective at reducing
delays, suggesting that at an airport such as Newark, where a single airline is dominant to a relatively
small extent, cooperation is possible without regulation.
3.3.2 Continental Fleet Changes
Continental has made a number of changes to its fleet, and because of its hub operations and
corresponding dominance at Newark, these changes have had an effect on the airport. The most
significant fleet changes made by Continental include:
1. Renewal of the Continental fleet.
2. An increase in the average aircraft size operated through Newark.
3. A conversion from turboprops to regional jets.
Renewal of Continental Fleet
The current fleet operated by Continental is very new. 50% of its aircraft operating from Newark
on June 28, 2000 were manufactured after 1995, and 88% after 1985. The age of a fleet has a significant
effect on maintenance costs, as newer aircraft are more reliable and require less maintenance to keep
them airworthy; and on dispatch reliability, which directly impacts the number of mechanical delays. The
replacement of older aircraft with new aircraft is however expensive. The decision to re-equip the airline
with new aircraft was however described by Louis Farinaccio, Assistant Director of Operations for
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Continental Airlines, at Newark, on June 14 and 15, 2001, to be one of the most important strategic
changes made.
Increased Average Aircraft Size
Because of Newark's location in the Northeast, it is well positioned as a gateway to Europe, and
is used by Continental for these long haul flights. Because of its location on the east coast, a number of
Continental's domestic flights operated from Newark are also long haul, and this has allowed Continental
to increase the size of its aircraft, in an attempt to further reduce congestion. Figure 42 shows the average
capacity of the Continental operations at Newark for the last Wednesday in June for all years from 1995
to 2001.
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Figure 42. Average capacity of Continental operations at Newark, excluding Turboprops and Regional
Jets, last Wednesday in June, 1995 to 2001.
The average capacity decreases in 1997 because the McDonnell Douglas DC-I Os operated by
Continental were retired that year. The average capacity can then be seen to steadily increase from 154
passengers to an average of over 160 passengers in 2000. Because of the increase in aircraft size fewer
flights are offered between specific origin destinations pairs, and it is this reduction that reduces
congestion. Passengers do generally however prefer higher frequency because of the reduced connection
times and because flights are more likely to be at convenient times. This is not however such a problem
with international flights because passengers expect longer connection times and less frequency.
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Conversion from Turboprops to Regional Jets
Turboprops have higher cabin noise than jets, fly significantly slower, and operate at a lower
altitude, and thus experience more turbulence. Jets are also perceived by the flying public to be better. In
the case of very short haul flights turboprops still appear to have superior economics, but the stage length
at which this is no longer the case continues to drop. The result is that there has been a strong trend in the
airline industry to convert from turboprops to regional jets. Continental is no exception. Figure 43 shows
the percentage of Continental operations at Newark by turboprops and regional jets, for the last
Wednesday in June for all years from 1995 to 2001.
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Figure 43. Percentage of Continental operations by Turboprops and Regional Jets at Newark, last
Wednesday in June, 1995 to 2001.
Since 1997 there has been a clear decrease in the percentage of turboprops operated, and an
increase in the percentage of regional jets operated, suggesting that Continental has been actively
replacing turboprops with regional jets since 1997. The percentage of commuter aircraft operated clearly
decreases from 1997 to 2000, suggesting a move away from this type of aircraft. However, in 2001 the
percentage of commuter operations increases again, significantly, through a large increase in the
percentage of regional jets operated. This corresponds to the general industry trend towards more
commuter aircraft used on the increased frequency spoke flights from airline hubs. The reason for this is
the continually improving range and economics of regional jets.
Although regional jets are attractive to the airlines, because of the performance characteristics of
the aircraft their operation at Newark does lead to decreases in the efficiency of certain ATC operations.
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These include:
. An increase in the use of the primary parallel runways, and a corresponding decrease in the usage of
runway 11-29, because regional jets require more runway for take-off than turboprops.
. Increased arrival and departure separation requirements, which translates into a reduction in airport
and airspace capacity.
. Reduced use of LAHSO.
. More departure delays resulting from regional jets competing for high altitude routes out of the New
York Metropolitan area.
3.3.3 Schedule Changes
One of the most significant airline responses to delays at Newark has been adjustment of their
schedules. The most significant changes have been those made by Continental, since 1997, including a
change to its banking structure.
Schedule De-banking
A traditional airline schedule is designed around banks, which are periods when a high number of
flights arrive or depart. These are separated by periods when few flights arrive or depart. Flights are
grouped in banks to avoid long layover times for connecting passengers. The system works well when the
daily volume of flights through the airport is not close to the airport capacity, as it can be run near
capacity during the banks, and well below capacity between banks. Airlines are also able to recover from
any delays that occur during a bank by utilizing the excess capacity between the banks. Such a schedule
however is ineffective at airports where the banks exceed airport capacity during adverse weather to such
an extent that delays cannot be recovered. This was the case at Newark in 1996. Continental airlines thus
reduced the degree to which its schedule was banked, as can be seen by comparing the schedule in 1996
and 2001 in Figure 44 and Figure 45. The VFR and IFR capacities are also shown in these figures.
# of flights through Newark
25
20 6 nepartur
15
10
5-R
0 - ., 11 I 11 -
6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00
Time - 5 rinute incrernents
Figure 44. Airport schedule of all airlines operating at Newark, June 26, 1996.
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Figure 45. Airport schedule of all airlines operating at Newark, June 27, 2001.
In order to measure the degree to which an airport has a banked structure to its schedule, a metric
was developed by Prof. John-Paul Clarke (MIT department of Aeronautics and Astronautics). The basis
for the metric is the average number of connecting flights for each arrival throughout the day, per five
minute interval, plotted against the time since the arrivals. The plot in Figure 46 shows this for
Continental flights on June 26, 1996. The shape of the plot relates directly to the banking structure. A
banked structure would show a large number of flights relatively soon after each arrival, decreasing
quickly as the time since arrival increases. An un-banked schedule would show a flat plot, with little
change in the average number of connecting flights as the time since the arrival increases. Because the
drop off in connections is approximately linear, a straight line can be fitted through the data points after
the first peak. A more highly banked schedule has a steeper gradient. A metric for the degree to which the
schedule is banked can then be defined as the inverse of the magnitude of the gradient of this straight
line. This metric represents the number of minutes required for the number of connections to reduce by 1
flight. Thus:
MetricBanking structure
where m is the gradient of the straight line fitted to the data.
The plots in Figure 46 to Figure 48 show the average number of connecting flights for
Continental Airlines, at Newark, for every five minute period plotted against the time since each arrival.
A straight line is fitted through a consistent portion of the data, the equation of which is also presented,
from which the desired metric for banking structure can be calculated.
The schedule shown in Figure 46, for June 1996, is a highly banked structure, peaking 45
minutes after the arrivals. A second bank is also clear, peaking 3 hours 20 minutes after the arrivals. The
period between the banks, which averages a low 1.5 connections per arrival, is 1 hour 35 minutes. This
provides a long recovery period between banks. The straight-line curve fit yields a metric of 23.6 minutes
per connection.
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As Figure 47 shows, there is a clear change in the banking structure in 1997. The first bank is no
longer clear, nor does there appear to be a second bank. Significantly the straight-line curve fit yields a
metric of 52.4 minutes per connection, which is significantly higher than that for 1996. The schedule is
clearly flatter and less banked than in the previous year. This is one of the changes instituted after Gordon
Bethune became CEO of Continental.
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Figure 47. Banking Structure, Continental Airlines at Newark, Wednesday June 25, 1997.
The flattening of the banking structure at Newark continued after 1997, with 1998 yielding a
metric of 72.5 minutes per connection, 1999 a metric of 164 minutes per connection, and 2000 a metric of
213 minutes per connection. Figure 48 shows the structure in 2001, with a metric of 222 minutes per
connection. The schedule is clearly very flat, with no banks visible.
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There is a clear change from a highly banked schedule in 1996, to a considerably flatter schedule
in 2001. It is also however important to consider other aspects of the schedule operated, such as the
number and size of recovery periods. Although this affects the plots presented it is clearer to consider the
whole schedule separately. Figure 49 and Figure 50 show the Continental schedules operated at Newark
in 1996 and 2001, from 6am to midnight.
Figure 49 shows the schedule in 1996. Arrival and departure banks are clear in the morning, and
there are some significant recovery periods. In the afternoon, however, the banking structure is less
obvious, although the banks can still be identified. Recovery periods are shorter. Operations only appear
to start in earnest at 7:00. The busiest period is in the afternoon and evening, extending from 13:00 to
20:30. Departures appear to effectively end at 21:30, and arrivals at 20:30, although arrivals continue
after this time at a low rate, until 23:30.
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Fige 49. Combined Continental schedule operated at Newark, June 26, 1996.
Figure 50 shows the schedule in 2001. This appears to be very much flatter than that in 1996. No
banks are visible and the number of flights remains approximately constant throughout the day. Recovery
periods are however still present, although they are few and short. Departures clearly start earlier, before
73
6:30, although the first arrivals continue to be scheduled after 7:00. The busiest period of the day,
although difficult to identify, again appears to be during the afternoon, from 14:00 to 21:00. Departures
now end at past 22:00, and arrivals continue to midnight. Continental appears to have thus extended its
schedule to utilize the early morning and late evening to a greater extent. Although it is not shown in the
data, the first arrivals are at 4:15 in the morning, and the last arrival at 2:30 the next morning. This
change was part of Continental's Project Total, in 2001. Other changes were also made in the project,
including a change from a weekly schedule to a day-by-day schedule.
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Figure 50. Continental schedule operated at Newark, June 27, 2001.
Considering a complete schedule, including other operators, suggests that most operators have
extended their schedules as Continental has done. However, most have not de-banked their schedules to
the extent that Continental has.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Considering the average yearly delays in Figure 41, it is clear that there is a decrease in both
arrival and departure delays from 1996 to 1997. Although this decrease is likely to be primarily related to
weather, the changes made by Continental, and particularly the change in banking structure, appear to
have had an impact on reducing delays. The increase in delays is also slow from 1997 to 2000, which
coincides with the continued reduction in the degree of banking within the Continental Newark schedule,
and the extension of the schedule into the early morning and late afternoon, suggesting again that the
changes made had a positive effect on delays.
Although the flattening of Continental's schedule has reduced the number and duration of
recovery periods at Newark, recovery periods have not been removed completely. Some degree of delay
recovery is thus still possible during the day. With suitably sized recovery periods, a flat schedule can
have lower delays than an equivalent banked schedule, as is demonstrated in this case. However it is
recommended that the schedule be modified to optimize the magnitude and duration of the recovery
periods, to minimize the accumulation of delays.
74
3.3.4 Ground Operations
Continental Airlines has also made a number of changes to its ground operations in order to
improve the efficiency of operations at the airport, including the introduction of supertugs, for movement
of aircraft, and a number of changes to its specialized summer and winter operations.
Supertugs, developed by Douglas, of Birmingham, UK, are specially designed aircraft tugs that
are able to perform more complicated maneuvers, are more powerful, and travel faster than traditional
tugs. This allows them to operate on taxiways and thus reduces fuel bum. Instead of pulling the aircraft
by its nose wheel, supertugs lift the aircraft by the nose wheel, carrying the forward weight of the aircraft.
The aircraft is then moved in this lifted position, which is more stable than the traditional tow bar
attachment.
Supertugs were introduced at Newark in September 1998. Apart from the improved performance
of the tugs, they are simpler to manage and cheaper to operate. This is because of reduced labor
requirements, and a separate Continental department dedicated to supertug operation and maintenance. In
June 2000, Continental had 8 supertugs at Newark, some of which were operated up to 20 hours per day.
A number of changes were also made to the specialized winter and summer operations. This
includes the use of the supertugs and development of the Continental Passenger Recovery (CPR) plan
already mentioned in section 3.2.4. A number of changes in de-icing operations were also implemented,
including the introduction of new de-icing trucks and the building of a de-icing hanger on the north ramp.
3.3.5 Developing of Relationships
Continental has also further developed its relationship with the FAA and PANYNJ, and has
starting to develop a relationship with Amtrak.
FAA and PANYNJ
Because the primary constraint at Newark is downstream airspace constraints propagating back
to the airport, it is essential for the airlines at the airport not only to improve their operations, but also to
improve their relationship with the FAA and PANYNJ.
In recent years Continental Airlines has increased its communications with the FAA and
PANYNJ significantly. The FAA ATCT has extensive communication with the Continental ramp tower,
particularly when Continental pre-sequence aircraft for the departure queue. Similarly Continental and
the FAA cooperate when weather is impacting the airport, via Continental's extended ramp area
operations. The conditions of operation are detailed in a letter of agreement between Continental and the
FAA.
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There is also an ATC desk at the Continental headquarters in Houston, which is dedicated to
interacting with the ATCSCC.
The relationship between Continental and FAA was observed on the June 29, 2000, site visit to
the airport, when a Continental Airlines flight to John Wayne-Orange County Airport (SNA) was in
danger of missing the curfew in place to minimize community noise in Orange County. After discussions
between the FAA and Continental the flight was allowed to skip to the front of the departure queue,
whilst another Continental aircraft near the front of the queue was required to drop to the back.
Amtrak
With the increasing congestion at airports, but continuing growth in travel, any conversion from
air transport to ground transport would relieve the airspace system of some traffic. Such a conversion is
however only feasible for short haul flights, where travel time on the ground is still practical, and of the
same order of magnitude of a delayed short haul flight.
Since 1997 Continental Airlines has operated buses between Newark airport and Lehigh Valley
International Airport in Allentown, Pennsylvania (ABE); and since May 2000 Continental has started to
cancel short haul flights when weather impacts the airport, and transfer the passengers to trains. This
reduces delays of higher priority flights.
Because Continental Airlines considers rail transport to be a key component in its future
operations from Newark, it has started to develop a relationship with Amtrak. This includes an agreement
regarding the transfer of passengers from cancelled flights to Amtrak, and may in the future include a
code sharing agreement between the companies, allowing passengers to be scheduled on trains instead of
aircraft. Continental envisions a number of short haul destinations, including Hartford and Philadelphia,
served only by trains, which would reduce airspace congestion at Newark. This multi-modal approach
has already been successful in Europe. For example Air France has a code sharing agreement with French
railway company SNCF (Soci6t6 Nationale des Chemins de fer Frangais), in which passengers travel
from Paris to Brussels by rail, and not air. Air France also serve other destinations by rail.
Continental is in discussion with Amtrak to better accommodate passengers traveling to the
airport from Manhattan, by rail. The Newark monorail system has been extended to a new Northeast
Corridor train station, making the airport more accessible to passengers coming to the airport by rail. This
strategy has also been successful in Europe.
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3.3.6 New Facilities
Continental Airlines has also responded to the delays at Newark by further developing its
facilities at the airport. The most significant development is of a third concourse in Terminal C, located
west of the current Concourse 2. It includes 15 new gates and a new international arrivals facility, which
will mean that Continental international arrivals will no longer have to use Terminal B, which currently
has the only international arrivals facility at the airport.
Continental is also in the process developing a new cargo facility, a new operations ramp tower,
and a number of new hangers. Continental is clearly building a number of new facilities at the airport,
and investing a considerable amount of money into its operation there.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In 2000 Newark airport had the highest ATC delays in the country, and was second only to
LaGuardia in percentage of operations delayed. The cause of delays at Newark was primarily weather,
with 84% of arrival delays related in some way to weather. The weather's impact on the airport is related
to the sensitivity of the airport to adverse weather and the frequency of adverse weather. Newark also
operates a very full, flat schedule, with few recovery periods, and is highly congested, Newark being one
of four primary airports in the New York Metroplex. According to a site visit to the airport on June 29,
2000, the primary flow constraint, which leads to the high surface delays at the airport, is downstream
airspace capacity limitations.
Airline responses to the delays at Newark are extensive, and include both tactical level responses
and strategic level responses.
The key tactical responses to delays are currently the cancellation of low priority flights, and the
transfer of the passengers to ground transportation; pre-sequencing of departures by Continental; and
improved access to information, which is essential to the success of the other responses. The key
strategic responses include changes to the schedule operated at the airport, and particularly flattening out
of the banks operated; new aircraft which require less maintenance and have greater dispatch reliability;
and improved relations with the FAA and PANYNJ. The development of the relationship with Amtrak
and a move to a multi-modal transport system is also seen to be of key importance.
At Newark, Continental Airlines has demonstrated that delays can be reduced through a market
response, without further increased regulation. The responses have been extensive and successful, and are
thought to be the primary source behind the almost constant level of delays since 1997, despite increases
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elsewhere. Regulatory intervention in certain areas may however further reduce delays. This includes pre-
sequencing of all departures at the airport, and the operation of regional jets.
Currently Continental alone is pre-sequencing aircraft for the departure queue. Delays would be
further reduced if all aircraft at the airport were pre-sequenced. This would require building and operating
a ramp tower on the south ramp. This may be complicated because the south ramp is not dominated by
any single airline. Since it is likely to benefit all operators, it is likely to receive support, even from
Continental, which does operate from terminal A. The PANYNJ may however need to take the lead on
the development, because the airlines may need outside coordination to cooperate productively.
Because regional jets are particularly profitable to the airlines that operate them, and because
their impact on reducing the efficiency of the airport impacts all airlines at the airport together and not
just the regional jet operators, game theory predicts that airlines will continue to convert from turboprops
to regional jets. Even Continental, which is dominant at Newark airport, has replaced its turboprops with
regional jets, suggesting that its benefits outweigh the costs. It may thus be necessary for the PANYNJ to
introduce incentives or penalties. Particularly, incentives could be offered for operating aircraft that are
capable of using runway 11-29, for aircraft that have reduced separation requirements, and for aircraft
that do not require high altitude slots.
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CHAPTER 4: EXTENSION TO OTHER AIRPORTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Because ATC and the airlines at Newark airport have responded to delays in a number of ways,
growth in delays at the airport has been reduced from nearly 20% in 1997 to close to zero in 2000. This is
in contrast to the continuing growth in delays system wide of between 20 and 25%, detailed in Figure 2 in
Chapter 1. The lessons learned at Newark may be applicable to other airports, and applied appropriately
may thus reduce delays system wide as well. It is thus essential to examine the applicability of the
responses to delays at Newark to other airports in the system.
The key conclusion drawn from a site visit to Newark Airport and the New York TRACON on
June 29, 2000 was that downstream airspace capacity limitations were a primary flow constraint and the
primary cause of surface delays. Downstream constraints however impact all airports, to varying degrees,
as downstream constraints are a function of the system operation as well as individual airports operation.
Thus, responses at Newark airport that address downstream constraints should be applicable to all
airports, to varying degrees. The degree to which these responses may reduce delays is dependent on the
degree to which downstream constraints cause delays at each specific airport. Many airports also
experience delays caused by local constraints, which are those constraints not related to downstream
operations. Some of the responses to local constraints at Newark can also be applied to those airports
with similar local constraints.
The cause of delays was thus examined for the 10 most delayed airports in the United States in
2000. This is presented in the sections below, after identification of the stakeholders, and a summary of
the key responses to delays at Newark. The corresponding applicability of the responses to each airport is
presented alongside the causes of delays at each airport.
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4.2 STAKEHOLDERS
The key stakeholders in the problem of airport delays are the airlines operating at the airports; the
FAA, which controls the airspace system; and the airport authority, which operates the airport. In the case
of Newark the operator is the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Through the airlines, the
traveling public is also a stakeholder, and is the most directly impacted by airport delays. By extension,
since the economy of the United States is supported by air travel, all the people in the United States are
also stakeholders, indirectly.
The primary motivation of the airlines is to make money. It is thus essential for them to keep
people flying, as this is their primary source of revenue. As delays discourage people from flying, so the
airlines lose revenue, whilst maintaining similar costs. This is the primary reason that the airlines try to
reduce airport delays. However, a complex interrelationship exists where competition from other airlines
at the same airport, and in the same markets, encourages an increase in the frequency of operations at the
airport. This generally leads to greater delays.
The basic role of the ATC system in the United States is firstly to prevent collisions between
aircraft that fly in the system, and secondly to organize and expedite the safe and orderly flow of air
traffic whilst utilizing the airspace as efficiently as possible [12]. These interests do however sometimes
lead to opposing requirements. For example, concerning aircraft separation standards, improved flow
efficiency would result from decreased separation standards, whilst improved safety would result from
increasing separation standards. In these cases safety must be satisfied first.
The interest of the airport authority is also a balance between safe and orderly flow of air traffic
utilizing the airport, and recovering revenue from the airport operations, which includes airside fees,
landside fees, and terminal revenue through sales.
4.3 RESPONSES TO DELAYS
Responses to airport delays are either market driven, or regulatory. Because the airline industry
has been deregulated since 1978, airline responses to delays are mostly market driven. However, because
ATC in the United States continues to be governed by the DOT, through the FAA, ATC responses are
through regulation.
Many of the responses to date have been market driven. This is because business economics
requires the airlines to react to delays. This forces the airlines to overcome the bureaucracy behind
decision-making faster than is required of government agencies, which are not driven by the same
business economics. The majority of these market driven responses have however been small and have
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resulted in only small delay reductions. These responses have been limited because the nature of the
system is such that market driven responses are only viable at airports that are dominated by a single
airline. The industry is highly competitive, and because most airports are unrestricted, they are unlimited
resources to all airlines that choose to operate there. This means that if any carrier reduces its operations,
other carriers will increase their operations to take advantage of the newly available capacity. Many
attempts to reduce delays individually are thus ineffective and uncompetitive. Any attempt to reduce
competition on routes, specifically by merging airlines, has also generally been opposed by government
anti-trust action. Market driven responses thus appear to be limited in their ability to reduce delays,
unless anti-trust laws within the airline industry are relaxed.
Regulatory responses to delays have been limited to date, although some significant responses
are under development. This includes a redesign of the airspace and demand management strategies,
including peak hour pricing. These may take time to be implemented, but are likely to be the most
effective at reducing delays.
The responses to delays identified at Newark are summarized below.
4.3.1 Key Responses to Delays at Newark
ATC Responses
ATC responses to the delays at Newark have been both tactical and strategic. The standard
tactical response, which is utilized throughout the NAS, is the application of restrictions and reroutes.
Restrictions are implemented not only because of local weather, but also because of downstream weather
and traffic demand through the departure fixes.
Dynamic re-routing is difficult throughout the NAS because all the impacted facilities must be in
agreement before a re-route is approved. Dynamic re-routing is however particularly difficult in regions
of high airspace congestion, because the facilities involved have less flexibility. The development of a set
of preplanned reroutes for specific fix and jet-route closures would thus be most effective at reducing
delays in these regions of high airspace congestion. The National Playbook is such a document, but
currently focuses predominantly on operations in New York.
Decisions aiding tools, such as DSP and ITWS, have recently been implemented at Newark and
its associated ATC facilities. DSP is used predominantly for communication, and would thus be most
useful at facilities that suffer from high airspace congestion and require streamlined communication.
ITWS however helps decision-making regarding application of restrictions, and would thus be useful for
implementation at any facilities that are highly impacted by weather. The general implementation of
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decision adding tools is likely to see most benefits from facilities with high airspace congestion, because
it would reduce controller workload, and improve the efficiency of operations.
Improved inter-facility communication and further centralization of authority to the ATCSCC
would reduce the ambiguity of the organizational structure and correspondingly reduce delays at Newark.
This would improve operations throughout the NAS, but like further development of the National
Playbook, would be most effective at reducing delays in those regions with high airspace congestion.
Increased utilization of runway 11-29 through the New York airspace redesign would also reduce
delays at Newark. This is a local response, and a similar response could be applied to other airports with
underutilized runways. The reasons for a runways under-utilization are however highly local.
Strategic responses to delays in the system include the formation of the ATCSCC, which is a
system wide response, and the redesign of the New York airspace. The New York airspace redesign, part
of the FAA's National Airspace System Operational Evolution Plan, is a top priority to alleviate
congestion at the New York airports. Other similar programs within the National Airspace System
Operational Evolution Plan focus on other regions with high airspace congestion. These responses are
likely to have the greatest impact on reducing delays system wide.
Airline Responses
Airline responses to the delays at Newark have also been both tactical and strategic. A key
tactical airline response to delays at Newark is the cancellation of low priority flights to reduce delays on
higher priority flights. Passengers from the cancelled flights are sent to their destinations by other modes
of transportation. This response is likely to be effective only at airports that suffer from particularly high
delays; at which a single airline is dominant; and from which short haul flights are served efficiently by
other modes of transportation.
Continental Airlines also pre-sequences departures in order to reduce delays at Newark. Because
other airlines are not able to pre-sequence their departures, Continental delays are reduced in comparison
to the other carriers. Without regulation, this response can only be applied by airlines with airport
dominance, and control of extensive ramp area. However, if the airport or FAA regulated pre-sequencing,
this response could reduce delays at any airport that has appropriate taxiway configurations to allow it.
Continental has also responded to delays by taking steps to improve information availability to
passengers and to ramp controllers. Although improved information availability to passengers does not
reduce delays, it does allow the delays to be better understood and thus more readily accepted. This
response would be effective at any airport suffering from severe delays. Improved information
availability to the Continental ramp tower includes operation of the ITWS and WSI weather information
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systems in the ramp tower, and a direct hotline with the FAA ATCT, which allows improved tactical
response to delays. This is essential to the success of all other responses, and is applicable to any airport
in which the airlines play a significant role in ramp and taxi operations.
A key strategic response to delays at Newark is a reduction in the growth of operations at the
airport. This response is likely to limit the growth of delays significantly, but at airports without a single
highly dominant airline is only really possible through regulation, because demand, and thus competition,
will continue to grow. This response is more important at airports that are limited in their potential to
increase in capacity because of environmental or community constraints, such as at Newark.
Continental also operates a very new fleet, which reduces maintenance delays and improves
dispatch reliability. Continental has also increased the size of the aircraft operating from Newark,
increasing capacity without increasing operations. Introduction of a new fleet can be implemented by any
airline, but requires high capital investment. An increase in the average size of the aircraft operated from
an airport, however, affects the entire system operated by the airline. Continental operates Newark as an
international hub, which gains from an increase in the average aircraft size. This response must therefore
be matched to the airline's operations at the airport.
Changes to the schedule operated by Continental, particularly the flattening out of the banks
operated at the airport, is significant and reduces delays resulting from the banks operating well beyond
capacity. Average connecting times for passengers are however increased. Because Continental is using
Newark as an international hub this is not a problem. This response is thus only likely to reduce delays at
airports that operate banks well beyond capacity, and are not able to recover the delays between banks.
The response is also only really acceptable at international hubs, because of the increased connecting
times. Continental has however also extended the schedule earlier into the morning and later in the night.
This response is applicable to any airport, although is dependent on time zones and the number of
transcontinental and transatlantic flights operated, and is limited at airports with noise curfews.
Continental has also improved ground operations including the operation of super-tugs and new
de-icing equipment. Super-tugs particularly improve taxi operations, and could be utilized effectively at
any airport by airlines requiring extensive taxi operations.
Finally Continental continues to develop its relationship with the FAA and PANYNJ. Such
improved relations would be beneficial to any airport, but particularly those with confined taxi
operations. Continental has also started to develop a relationship with Amtrak, and is moving towards
development of a multi-modal transportation system. Development of the relationship with Amtrak and a
move to a multi-modal transport system is seen to be of key importance for the future. A move towards a
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multi-modal transportation system is again only likely to be effective at airports from which short haul
flights are served efficiently by other modes of transportation
The specific applicability of the above responses to the 10 most delayed airports in the United
States is presented in section 4.4 below.
4.4 EXTENSION TO OTHER AIRPORTS
The 10 airports with the highest number of delays in 2000 were as follows:
1. LaGuardia (61,120 delays)
2. Chicago O'Hare (57,545 delays)
3. Newark (37,132 delays)
4. Atlanta (28,229 delays)
5. San Francisco (24,478 delays)
6. Boston (24,120 delays)
7. Philadelphia (21,521 delays)
8. Dallas/Ft. Worth (20,638 delays)
9. Los Angeles (17,141 delays)
10. Phoenix (14,024 delays)
The significance of the delays at these airports is dependent on the number of operations at the
airports. The chart in Figure 51 shows the percentage of operations delayed in 2000. The average is that
of the 31 busiest airports in the United States. Clearly all have a higher percentage of operations delayed
than the average.
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Figure 51. Percentage of operations delayed for 15 most delayed airports in the US, 2000 [3]
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The increase in delays over the year preceding 2000 is presented in Figure 52. The increases in
the percentage of flights delayed at Chicago O'Hare, San Francisco, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Philadelphia,
Boston, Los Angeles and LaGuardia are all greater than 15%, which is a significant increase over a single
year. The increases at Newark and Phoenix are significantly lower, below 5%. At Atlanta the percentage
of flights delayed has decreased.
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Figure 52. Percentage increase in number of delays per 1000 operations for the 15 most delayed airports
in the US, 1999 to 2000.
The increases in delays from 1997 to 2000 are presented in Figure 53. This chart shows the trend
in delays at the airports over the last 4 years, and thus provides a better indication of the long-term
increases in delays at the airports. Atlanta shows a decrease in operations, whilst all the other airports
show increases in percentage delays greater than 20%. The greatest increases are for Chicago O'Hare,
Philadelphia and LaGuardia, which are all above 150%. Phoenix had an increase greater than 100%.
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Figure 53. Percentage increase in number of delays per 1000 operations for the 15 most delayed airports
in the US, 1997 to 2000.
The airports that suffer particularly from historically high delays, but have not increased
significantly in the four years preceding 2001 are Newark and San Francisco. Airports that had
significant increases in delays in the 4 years preceding 2001, but little in 2000 were Chicago O'Hare and
Phoenix. Delays at LaGuardia, Philadelphia, and Boston also increased significantly in the 4 years
preceding 2001, but continued to show high increases in delays in 2000 as well. Los Angeles however
showed only recent high increases in delays, in 2000, and not in the 4 years prior to this. Atlanta showed
decreases over the 4 years prior to 2001, and in 2000 specifically.
Causes of Delays
Weather is the source of 68.7% of arrivals delays, system wide [6]. The cause of weather delays,
however, is related to the decrease in capacity at an airport resulting from adverse weather, the frequency
of adverse weather at the airport, the schedule operated at the airport, and local airspace congestion.
Figure 54 shows the average capacity drop resulting from adverse weather, at the 10 most
delayed airports in the United States. The chart plots the difference between average VFR and IFR
capacities, according to the FAA Airport Capacity Benchmark report [9]. The average is that of the 31
busiest airports in the country. Figure 55 then shows the frequency of adverse weather at the airports,
showing percentage of IFR operations at the same airports, during June 2000. Again the average is that of
the 31 busiest airports in the country. It is important to consider both the capacity reduction and the
frequency of the weather. Phoenix for example has the highest reduction in capacity induced by adverse
weather, but the lowest frequency of that adverse weather.
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Figure 54. Average airport capacity drop, in percentage, caused by adverse weather.
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Figure 55. Percentage of IFR operations, June 2000.
Multiplying the results of the two charts in Figure 54 and Figure 55, and then dividing by the
average of the 31 busiest airports in the country, yields a metric to describe the impact of adverse weather
on the airports, which is shown in Figure 56. As can be seen the most impacted airports are San
Francisco, Boston, and Dallas/Ft. Worth, which are all greater than 150% of the average. LaGuardia, Los
Angeles and Newark are also more impacted than the average. Phoenix, Atlanta, Chicago O'Hare, and
Philadelphia are all impacted to a lesser degree than the average.
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and percentage
The impact of the schedule on the operations at the airport is described in the chart in Figure 57,
which shows the percentage of operations above VFR capacity, in August 2000, according to the Air
Transport Association [6]. Data for Phoenix and LaGuardia was not available. Although Chicago O'Hare
and Atlanta have a high percentage of operations beyond capacity, the impact of adverse weather on the
airport is not as significant. Boston, Dallas/Ft. Worth, San Francisco and Newark on the other hand have
few operations beyond capacity, but are the most impacted by adverse weather. These airports are also
some of the most delayed airports suggesting that there are other key factors affecting delays. These
include airspace and surface congestion, which are specific to each airport and to the banking structure
operated at the airports.
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Figure 57. Percentage of Operations above VFR Capacity, August 2000.
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Figure 58 shows an indication of the congestion problems at airports around the Unites States.
This chart was developed by MITrE/CAASD [23] through observations at the airports, and shows which
airports suffer from airspace congestion, surface congestion, or both. As can be seen in the figure, the
New York and Washington areas show particular problems with both airspace and surface congestion, as
do some other regions. Figure 59 shows average ATC departure delays in 2000, compared to that of the
average airport, as reported by the ATA [6]. The data for Dallas/Ft. Worth, Los Angeles and Phoenix was
unavailable. As the figure shows, average departure delays are highest at LaGuardia, Newark and
Philadelphia, all of which are in the New York Metroplex. ATC departure delays relate to both airspace
and surface congestion.
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Figure 58. Airspace and surface congestion in the United States [23].
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Figure 59. Average ATC departure delays, 2000 [6].
89
Specific consideration of the nature of the delays at each airport and of the responses identified at
Newark airport, enable recommendations to be made for extension of the lessons learned at Newark to
other airports. Such discussions follow in section 4.4.1 below.
4.4.1 Application to Specific Airports
Below is a discussion of the causes of delays and the most appropriate responses to delays at the
10 most delayed airports in the United Sates. An airport map is presented with each airport, with the blue
runways representing possible future runway developments at the airport. The arrow on each figure
points to North, and a scale is included with each figure.
New York LaGuardia (LGA)
I I
Oft"
Figure 60. Airport diagram of LaGuardia airport (LGA) [24].
As presented earlier in section 4.4, LaGuardia airport had the highest percentage of operations
delayed of any airport in the country in 2000, and the increase in delays since 1999, and since 1997, were
also the highest of any airport in the country. The increase in delays in 1999 was primarily because of the
lifting of slot restrictions on regional jet flights to small markets as mandated by the Air 21 legislation
[4]. In response a number of new operations were introduced without any corresponding increase in
capacity, resulting in severe delays. This legislation has since been reintroduced, in a different form, so
delays are not likely to increase as much in 2001.
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The weather impact metric, shown in Figure 56, is just above average for LaGuardia, suggesting
that although weather is a factor, there are also other factors that are causing the delays at the airport.
According to the study by MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23] both airspace and surface congestion
are primary causes of delays at LaGuardia. ATC departure delays at LaGuardia were also very high in
2000, as shown in Figure 59, suggesting that many of the delays at the airport are related to air traffic
control.
The schedule operated at LaGuardia is shown in Figure 61, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen although the majority of the demand is below capacity, demand peaks
beyond even VFR capacity every half hour. Recovery periods, especially during IFR conditions, are also
small. The banking structure, shown in Figure 62, is fairly flat, except for the effect of the high number of
flights scheduled on the hour and half hour. A banking metric, which measures the average time for the
number of connections available to reduce by one, is 256 minutes (4 hours 16 minutes) per connection.
This is high, indicating a fairly un-banked schedule. This is not surprising given the O-D nature of traffic
in and out of LaGuardia.
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Figure 61. Schedule operated at LaGuardia, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 62. Banking structure operated at LaGuardia, June 82, 2000.
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US Airways operates the most flights at LaGuardia with 41% of the scheduled operations at the
airport. American Airlines is second with 17.2%. Thus although the airport is not dominated by any one
airline, US Airways does have the most operations by a significant margin.
Recommended Responses
Because LaGuardia suffers from high delays and the schedule is very full, a reduction in the
number of operations is recommended. Because a single carrier does not dominate, however, regulatory
action is likely to be required to accomplish this. Regulatory responses such as peak hour pricing or other
forms of demand management are recommended. With high ATC delays, improvement of ATC
operations, through implementation of decision aiding tools, is also suggested, although in many cases it
has already been applied. Like Newark the greatest benefit is likely to come from the New York airspace
redesign.
Because of the lack of a single dominant carrier cancellation of low priority flights, to decrease
delays on high priority flights, is likely to be difficult. It would however be likely to reduce delays.
Similarly pre-sequencing departures according to fixes and fix restrictions would also be likely to reduce
delays, but may require regulation because of the lack of a dominant carrier. A move to a multi-modal
transportation system may also reduce delays, and is particularly applicable to LaGuardia because of the
airports location in a large city in the North East, near to a number of other large cities. LaGuardia is also
a domestic airport and is thus likely to operate a high number of short haul flights.
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Chicago O'Hare (ORD)
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Figure 63. Airport diagram of Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) [24].
As presented earlier in section 4.4, in 2000 Chicago O'Hare had a high percentage of operations
delayed in comparison to the average. Also, whilst the increase in delays since 1999 was fairly small, the
increase since 1997 was particularly high. The growth in delays at Chicago O'Hare has thus been reduced
over the last year, suggesting that positive steps have been taken to reduce delays at the airport.
The weather impact metric for Chicago O'Hare, shown in Figure 56, is below the average,
suggesting that delays at the airport are primarily caused by other factors. According to the study by
MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23] airspace congestion is a primary cause of delays at Chicago
O'Hare. This is supported by the fact that the average ATC departure delay, shown in Figure 59, was also
higher than that of the average airport, in 2000, suggesting that many of the delays at the airport are
related to air traffic control.
The schedule operated at Chicago O'Hare is shown in Figure 64, with the VFR and IFR
capacities superimposed. As can be seen, although the majority of the demand is below capacity, there
are a number of times at which demand is above even VFR capacity, and many cases where demand is
above IFR capacity. As presented in Figure 57 Chicago O'Hare has a high number of operations above
capacity. Chicago is slot controlled, however, so the number of operations is limited by regulation.
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Recovery periods are also small. The banking structure, shown in Figure 65, is fairly flat, but does show a
small degree of oscillation. This indicates some banking, which is supported by the banking metric,
which is relatively low at 26.8 minutes per connection.
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Figure 64. Schedule operated at Chicago O'Hare, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 65. Banking structure operated at Chicago O'Hare, June 82, 2000.
United Airline operates the most flights at Chicago O'Hare with 49.5% of scheduled operations.
American Airlines is second with 34.3%. Thus no single carrier dominates the airport, even though both
United and American have a high percentage of operations.
Recommended Responses
As ATC is a significant cause of delays at the airport extension of the National Playbook to also
focus on Chicago may increase the utilizations of re-routes, and thus reduce delays. Similarly increased
use of decision aiding tools may reduce controller workload and improve the efficiency of ATC
operations, and thus reduce delays. Because a single carrier does not dominate the airport, pre-sequencing
of departures is likely to be difficult to coordinate, short of regulation. Because of the high airspace
congestion, however, pre-sequencing of departures may reduce delays very successfully. The
introduction of regulation to implement pre-sequencing of departures may be easier at Chicago O'Hare
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than at other airports, as the airport is already regulated with slot control. A decrease in operations may
also reduce delays. This would require reduction of the number of slots available, which is likely to be
difficult because of the politics associated with slot control.
Atlanta (ATL)
Figue 66. Airport diagram of the William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport (ATL) [24].
As presented earlier in section 4.4, delays at Atlanta airport in 2000 were above average.
However, the airport had shown a significant decrease in delays since 1999, and a small decrease since
1997. This suggests that changes have been made at Atlanta since 1997 that have been very successful.
According to Figure 56 the weather impact metric at Atlanta is below average, suggesting that
other factors cause the majority of the delays at the airport. Specifically, according to the study by
MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23], both airspace and surface congestion are primary causes of
these delays. The average ATC departure delays, as shown Figure 59, was also higher than that of the
average airport in 2000, suggesting that some amount of the airspace and surface congestion is related to
ATC.
The schedule operated at Atlanta is shown in Figure 67, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen, although the majority of the demand is below capacity, the departure
banks extend above both VFR and IFR capacity in many instances. According to Figure 57 a high
number of operations at Atlanta in August 2000 were above capacity, suggesting that the schedule is one
of the primary causes of delays at the airport. There are still a number of recovery periods present,
although many are not long. The banking structure, shown in Figure 68, oscillates significantly,
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suggesting a highly banked schedule. This is also supported by the banking metric of only 14.0 minutes
per connection.
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Figure 67. Schedule operated at Atlanta, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 68. Banking structure operated at Atlanta, June 82, 2000.
Delta Airline is the dominant carrier by a significant margin, operating 65.6% of scheduled
operations at the airport, with Airtran second, operating 9.2% of operations. No other carrier operates
more than 4% of operations. Thus Atlanta is heavily dominated by a single airline, Delta.
Recommended Responses
Because the airport is impacted by ATC related delays, the extension of the National Playbook to
also focus on Atlanta may reduce delays by providing pre-planned re-routes. However, weather is not as
significant a problem at Atlanta as at Newark. The National Playbook is thus likely to be less effective at
reducing delays than at Newark. Increased usage of decision aiding tools by ATC, such as the Dynamic
Spacing Program (DSP), is also likely to reduce delays by streamlining communication and enabling
ATC to handle the airspace congestion in the region more efficiently.
96
Delta Airlines may be able to reduce delays at the airport by pre-sequencing departures according
to departure fixes and fix restrictions. This may also require improved coordination with the FAA, to
improve the operation of the pre-sequencing, but because Delta dominates the airport, pre-sequencing
may be possible without further regulation. Cancellation of low priority flights in order to reduce the
delays of higher priority flights may also reduce delays, but there are fewer destinations close enough to
replace with ground transportation to make this response as successful as at Newark. A decrease in
operations is likely to reduce delays as it appears that the schedule operated is a significant cause of the
delays. Again, because Delta dominates the airport this may be possible without regulation. Similarly, de-
banking may reduce delays, although since the schedule has few recovery periods already this response
may not reduce delays significantly. Delta also does not use Atlanta primarily as an international hub, but
as both its primary domestic hub, and an international hub. This response may thus be unattractive to
passengers because of the increased connection times.
San Francisco (SFO)
Figure 69. Airport diagram of San Francisco International Airport (SFO) [24].
As presented in section 4.4, delays at SFO in 2000 were high, whilst the increases in delays since
1999 and 1997 were relatively low. This suggests that SFO has reacted to the increase in delays, and like
Newark, has managed to reduce the growth in delays.
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According to Figure 56 the weather impact metric is the highest of the airports in the country,
and well above the average. This suggests that weather is a very significant cause of delays at the airport.
According to the study by MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23] airspace congestion is also a
significant cause of delays at SFO. This is likely because of its location in the San Francisco Bay area, the
ATC system for which is complicated by a number of other large airports including Oakland and San
Jose. In 2000, however, SFO had an average ATC departure delay only just above that of the average
airport, as shown in Figure 59.
The schedule operated at SFO is shown in Figure 70, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen, although the majority of the demand is below capacity, there is some
demand above IFR capacity, and even some above VFR capacity. As seen in Figure 57, however, SFO
has a fairly low number of operations above capacity. Under IFR conditions, however, recovery periods
are very small. The banking structure, shown in Figure 71, is extremely flat, and the banking metric is
238 hours per connection. This is the highest of any airport considered, indicating the flattest banking
structure of the airports considered.
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Figure 70. Schedule operated at SFO, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 71. Banking structure operated at SFO, June 82, 2000.
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United Airlines is the dominant carrier by a significant margin, operating 62.9% of scheduled
operations at the airport. No other carrier operates more than 8% of operations. Thus SFO is heavily
dominated by a single airline, United.
Recommended Responses
Because weather is significant problem at SFO it is likely that extension of the National Playbook
to focus on the Bay area would reduce delays at the airport, providing pre-planned re-routes that would
be faster to implement in adverse weather conditions than standard re-routes. Similarly the
implementation of decision aiding tools such as ITWS would improve ATC operations by improving
decision making regarding application of restrictions. DSP is also likely to be successful at SFO because
the airport suffers from airspace congestion problems, and is located near other large airports. Finally
regarding regulatory responses, a redesign of the airspace, as is underway in New York is likely to
improve operations and thus reduce delays, although probably not to the extent of New York.
A reduction in the number of operations at the airport may reduce delays as demand often
exceeds even VFR capacity. Because the airport is dominated by a single carrier, this may also be
possible with little regulatory action. Pre-sequencing of departures is also likely to reduce delays at the
airport, because weather and airspace congestion are a problem, although because average ATC delays
are not particularly high, this response is not likely to be as successful at SFO as at Newark. Because the
airport is dominated by a single carrier, it is likely that no further regulation will be required to introduce
pre-sequencing. Cancellation of short haul flights in preference for higher priority flights is also likely to
reduce delays, and because the airport is located near some other cities, transferring the displaced
passengers onto rail may be possible. It is not however likely to be as convenient as in the North East.
Similarly a general move to multi-modal transport may have a degree of success in the region. Finally
United may also be able to increase the average size of the aircraft operating at the airport, as the airport
can be used as an international hub to the Pacific Rim.
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Boston (BOS)
Figure 72. Airport diagram of General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport, Boston (BOS)
[24].
As seen earlier in section 4.4, the percentage of operations delayed at Boston Logan in 2000 was
particularly high, as was the increase in delays since 1999. The increase in delays since 1997 was also
high, although not to the same extent. This suggests that delays will continue to rise and that responses to
this increase have not been successful as yet.
The weather impact metric, presented in Figure 56, is very well above the average, and the
second highest of the airports considered, suggesting that weather is a particularly significant cause of
delays at the airport. According to the study by MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23] surface
congestion is also a primary cause of delays at Boston Logan. Despite this the average ATC departure
delay at Boston Logan in 2000 was above that of the average airport, as shown in Figure 59. Part of the
reason for this is that the ramp at Boston Logan is also controlled by ATC, and thus surface congestion is
affected by ATC departure delays to a greater extent.
The schedule operated at Boston Logan is shown in Figure 73, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen, although the majority of the demand is below capacity, there is some
demand above even VFR capacity. According to Figure 57 there are few operations above capacity.
Particularly during IFR conditions, however, there are few recovery periods. The banking structure,
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shown in Figure 74, is very flat. The banking metric is consequently high, at 323 minutes (3 hours 23
minutes) per connection.
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Figure 73. Schedule operated at Boston Logan, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 74. Banking structure operated at Boston Logan, June 82, 2000.
US Airways operates the highest number of flights at the airport, at 30.7% of scheduled
operations; American Airlines operates the second highest number, at 21.6%; and United Airlines
operates the third highest, at 10.9%. Thus Boston Logan is not dominated by any single airline.
Recommended Responses
Because weather is a cause of delays at the airport the extension of the National Playbook to also
focus on Boston is likely to improve the efficiency of re-routing, and may thus reduce delays. Similarly
the introduction of decision aiding tools such as ITWS may improve ATC operations, which appears to
be a significant cause of delays at the airport. Unfortunately because the entire ramp in controlled by the
FAA, pre-sequencing of departures by the airlines is not possible. However, a decrease in the number of
operations at the airport would be possible through regulation, and may reduce delays. Because no single
carrier is dominant, the number of operations is unlikely to be reduced without regulation.
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Because the airport is not dominated by a single carrier, airline responses are limited. However, if
any airline converts to operating primarily international flights at the airport, average aircraft size may
increase, which may reduce delays if fewer aircraft are then operated. Given the airports location in the
North East a general conversion to multi-modal transport may also be successful, and reduce delays by
reducing the number of flights to nearby cities.
Philadelphia (PHL)
/
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Figure 75. Airport diagram of Philadelphia International Airport (PHL) [24].
Earlier in section 4.4 it was presented that the percentage of operations delayed at Philadelphia in
2000 was fairly high, as was the increase in delays since 1999. The increase in delays since 1997,
however, was very large. This suggests that the responses to delays at this airport have not been
successful at reducing the increase in delays.
The weather impact metric calculated for Philadelphia is below average, as shown in Figure 56,
suggesting that weather is not a particularly significant problem at the airport. According to the study by
MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23], however, both airspace and surface congestion are primary
causes of delays at Philadelphia. The airspace problems correspond to the airports location between the
very busy airspaces of both New York and Washington DC. As shown in Figure 59, in 2000 the average
ATC departure delay at the airport was high in comparison to that of the average airport.
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The schedule operated at Philadelphia is shown in Figure 76, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen although the majority of demand is below both VFR and IFR capacity,
there are many occasions when demand exceeds capacity for brief periods. Because of these periods
Philadelphia has a fairly high percentage of operations above capacity, as shown in Figure 57. In most
cases however there are large recovery periods even during IFR conditions. The banking structure, shown
in Figure 77, shows some oscillation, and yields a banking metric of 27 minutes per connection,
indicating that the schedule is banked, although not strongly.
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Figure 76. Schedule operated at Philadelphia, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 77. Banking structure operated at Philadelphia, June 82, 2000.
US Airways dominates the airport, operating a large 70.2% of scheduled operations. No other
airline operates more than 6% of the flights at the airport. Thus Philadelphia is highly dominated by a
single airline.
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Recommended Responses
Extension of the National Playbook to also focus on Philadelphia is likely to improve re-routing
from the airport, and reduces delays, with the airport suffering from airspace congestion. Similarly, the
application of decision aiding tools such as DSP is likely to improve operations, by streamlining
communications and improving the efficiency of ATC operations. This is likely to be particularly
beneficial at Philadelphia as it is situated right between New York ARTCC and Washington ARTCC.
Related to this, NASA Ames is currently working on a development of the Traffic Management Advisor
(TMA), a decision support tool for ARTCCs. The new tool, called Multi-Center TMA (McTMA), is to
aid coordination between more than one center, and is specifically being designed for application at
Philadelphia [25]. The redesign of the New York airspace is likely to improve operations at Philadelphia
significantly, as the re-design is to include Philadelphia as well as the New York airports.
Because Philadelphia is also dominated by a single carrier, and suffers from many of the same
problems that Newark suffers from, many of the airlines responses at Newark may be applicable to
Philadelphia. Cancellation of short haul flights to reduce delays on higher priority flights is likely to
reduce delays, and because of the airports location, transferal of displaced passengers onto ground
transportation is likely to be successful. Similarly a general conversion to multi-modal transportation is
likely to be successful. Pre-sequencing of departures according to departure fixes and restrictions is also
likely to reduce delays, as the airport does have high delays related to ATC. This may also be possible
without regulation because there is a single dominant carrier. Also, if US Airways begins to operate the
airport particularly as an international hub, it may be able to de-bank to a certain degree and thus reduce
delays during banks. This is particularly likely to be possible given the large recovery periods currently in
the schedule.
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Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW)
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Figure 78. Airport diagram of Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) [24].
The percentage of operations delayed at DFW in 2000 was just above the average. This was also
the case for the increase in delays since 1997. However, the increase in delays since 1999 was larger.
This suggests that responses had been successful until 1999, but have become less successful more
recently.
As shown in Figure 56 the weather impact metric at DFW is well above the average, suggesting
that weather is a significant cause of delay at the airport. The majority of this adverse weather is in the
form of thunderstorms. According to the study by MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23] both airspace
and surface congestion are also significant causes of delays at DFW.
The schedule operated at DFW is shown in Figure 79, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen the majority of demand is below VFR capacity, but during the banks the
demand exceeds IFR capacity by a significant margin. According to Figure 57 a very low number of
operations are above capacity though. Large recovery periods also remain even under IFR conditions.
The banking structure, shown in Figure 80, shows very significant oscillations, and yields a banking
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metric of 6 minutes per connection. This is the lowest of all airports considered and indicates that the
schedule is very highly banked.
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Figure 79. Schedule operated at DFW, June 28, 2000.
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structure operated at DFW, June 82, 2000.
American Airlines dominates the airport, operating 71.9% of scheduled operations. No other
airline operates more than 12% of the flights at the airport. Thus DFW is heavily dominated by a single
airline, American.
Recommended Responses
Because DFW is impacted by weather, the extension of the National Playbook to also focus on
Dallas/Fort Worth is again likely to reduce delays by providing more efficient re-routing capabilities to
ATC. Similarly the introduction of decision aiding tools such as ITWS may also reduce delays by
improving the efficiency of ATC operations.
Again, because the airport is dominated by a single carrier, many of the responses by Continental
at Newark may be applicable to American at DFW. Cancellation of short haul flights in order to reduce
delays on the higher priority flights may be impractical because rail service in the South West is not well
developed, and cities are too far apart for practical service by bus. Because the airport suffers from
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weather, airspace and surface issues, pre-sequencing of departures according to departure fix and
restrictions may reduce delays at DFW. Also, some degree of de-banking may reduce delays during IFR
conditions, although because the airport is not an international hub, this may be less attractive to
passengers, because of the increased connection times.
Los Angeles (LAX)
Figure 81. Airport diagram of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) [24].
As presented earlier in section 4.4, the percentage of operations at LAX that were delayed in
2000 was only just above the average. In contrast, the increase in delays since 1999 was significant,
whilst that since 1997 was small. Thus the increase in delays is particularly recent.
The weather impact metric at LAX is above the average, as shown in Figure 56, and suggests that
weather does cause delays at the airport, although there are likely to be other significant causes as well.
According to the study by MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23] both airspace and surface congestion
are primary causes of delays at LAX. The airspace congestion corresponds to the airports location near a
number of other significant airports such as John Wayne/Orange County Airport, Burbank-Glendale-
Pasadena Airport, Ontario International Airport, and Long Beach/Daugherty Field airport. LAX also only
uses one primary departure fix.
The schedule operated at LAX is shown in Figure 82, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen there is much demand above both the VFR capacity and the IFR capacity.
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According to Figure 57 the percentage of operations above VFR capacity is correspondingly relatively
high. Recovery periods are also small, suggesting that the schedule may be a cause of delays. The
banking structure, shown in Figure 83, is very flat, and consequently yields a banking metric of a high
149 minutes (2 hours 29 minutes) per connection.
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Figure 82. Schedule operated at LAX, June 28, 2000.
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United Airlines dominates the airport, operating 36.2% of scheduled operations. The second and
third largest operators are American Airlines at 15.2, and Southwest Airlines at 13.7. LAX is thus
dominated by United, but not to a significant degree.
Recommended Responses
As at many of the other airports considered, because airspace congestion and weather are
problems at the airport, the extension of the National Playbook to also focus on Los Angeles would
improve re-routing operations, and may thus reduce delays. Similarly the introduction of decision aiding
tools such as DSP and ITWS may improve the efficiency of ATC operations, and thus reduce delays. Pre-
sequencing of departures according to departure fixes and restrictions may also reduce delays, but
because the airport is not dominated by a single carrier, its introduction may require regulation. Similarly
a decrease in the number of operations at the airport would require regulatory action, and may
particularly reduce the number of delays at the airport significantly because the schedule operated
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currently is very full. Finally, because of the location of the airport close to a number of other significant
airports, a redesign of the airspace may reduce delays.
The responses by the airlines are likely to more limited at LAX than at Newark because no single
carrier is dominant. However, a move to a multi-modal transportation system would be possible, as there
are some short haul destinations within range of LAX for practical service with ground transportation.
Cancellation of short haul flights to reduce delays on higher priority flights is however unlikely to reduce
delays by a significant degree unless most carriers responded in this way. Similarly, a move to the use of
larger aircraft, and thus a reduction in frequency of operations, is only likely to be effective in reducing
delays if most carriers respond in this manner. The use of larger aircraft would be feasible as LAX is
operated as an international hub to the Pacific Rim.
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Fige 84. Airport diagram of Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX) [24].
The percentage of operations at Phoenix in 2000 that were delayed is just above average. Closer
inspection of the data reveals that whilst the increase in delays since 1999 was small, the increase in
delays since 1997 was large. It thus appears that there have been successful responses to the delays at
Phoenix recently.
The weather impact metric calculated for Phoenix, presented in Figure 56, is very well below the
average, and the lowest of the airports considered. This suggests that weather is not a significant cause of
109
delays at the airport. According to the study by MITRE CAASD shown in Figure 58 [23], however, both
airspace and surface congestion are primary causes of delays at Phoenix.
The schedule operated at Phoenix is shown in Figure 85, with the VFR and IFR capacities
superimposed. As can be seen much of the demand is above the IFR capacity, and some above the VFR
capacity as well. Recovery periods are large during VFR conditions but very small during IFR conditions.
The banking structure, shown in Figure 84, shows clear oscillations, and yields a banking metric of 20
minutes per connection, which is relatively low. This indicates there that the schedule is banked.
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Figure 85. Schedule operated at Phoenix airport, June 28, 2000.
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Figure 86. Banking structure operated at Phoenix, June 82, 2000.
Southwest Airlines operates the highest number flights at the airport, with 36.4% of operations,
with America West Airlines very close behind with 35.2% of operations. No other carriers operate more
than 8%. Thus Phoenix is not dominated by a single airline, but instead by two.
Recommended Responses
Because airspace congestion is a problem at the airport, the implementation of decision aiding
tools such as DSP may improve the efficiency of ATC operations, and thus reduce delays. Similarly pre-
sequencing of departures according to departure fixes and restrictions may also reduce delays. However
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because the airport is not dominated by a single airline, regulation may be required to implement pre-
sequencing. Similarly a decrease in the number of operations may reduce delays, but would also require
regulatory action.
4.4.2 Conclusions
As the analysis in section 4.4.1 has shown, a number of the responses identified at Newark are
applicable to other airports in the Unites States. The responses appear to be particularly applicable to
Atlanta airport, San Francisco airport, Philadelphia airport, and Dallas/Fort Worth airport. It is also
important, however, to consider the policy implications of the responses identified, to ensure that these
responses will be effective and to identify challenges in their implication.
4.5 POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
A number of responses to delays identified in the study of Newark airport are applicable to most
if not all airports. These responses include the improvement of inter-facility communication within the
ATC system. Any improvement in ATC operations would reduce delays system-wide, and inter-facility
communication within the system is in need of improvement, as identified by Davison and Hansman [18].
Similar improvement in the cooperation and coordination between the operators at the airport, including
the FAA, the airport authority, and the airlines, is likely to improve efficiency and thus reduce delays at
any airport. Relating to strategic airline responses, extension of the schedule further into the early
morning and late evening would reduce demand at other times, and thus reduce delays. This response is
however limited at some airports because of curfews. Also, upgrading an airline's fleet by retiring older
aircraft and purchasing new aircraft would reduce mechanical failures, improving dispatch reliability and
reducing gate delays. Similarly an upgrade of ground equipment, such as the introduction of supertugs,
would increase the efficiency of ground operations, and would thus reduce surface congestion.
The applicability of some other responses identified in the study of Newark airport could not be
ascertained, because of a lack of information about the airports and ATC facilities considered. These
responses include changes in the application of restrictions in the TRACON, increased utilization of any
underutilized runways, and increased information availability to the airport ramp tower, or other specific
facility.
A number of other responses to delays at Newark were identified to be applicable to the airports
considered in section 4.4.1. With respect to ATC responses these include the extension of the National
Playbook to also focus on other airports, the increased use of decision aiding tools such as DSP and
ITWS, and redesign of the airspace. With respect to airline responses, which in many cases would have to
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be encouraged by regulation, these include pre-sequencing of departures, and a decrease in the number of
operations at the airport. A policy analysis is thus presented for each of these responses, in order to
determine their likely acceptance and effectiveness. In each case the pros and cons are detailed for ATC,
the airport authority, and the airlines operating at the airport. Particularly a reduction in delays is a
consistent pro, although it is beneficial to different stakeholders for different reasons. Thus, the benefits
to each stakeholder of reducing delays are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Pros and cons of reductions in delays
National Playbook Extension
This policy involves extension of the National Playbook to also focus on other ATC facilities and
airports, with pre-determined re-route suggestions for a number of the most likely fix and jet-route
closures. The outcome of such a tool would be increased utilization of re-routes, and thus improved
traffic flow during adverse weather conditions, and during other disruptions.
The books extension would have to be developed by the FAA, and particularly the FAA facilities
involved, although they would need to coordinate closely with the ATCSCC. Funding would also likely
come from the FAA. Pros and cons of the policy for each of the primary stakeholders are presented in
Table 2.
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Reduction in Delays
Stakeholder Pros Cons
* Reduced airspace congestion
Air Traffic Control e Efficient use of the airspace None(FAA) * Improved flow of traffic
* Improved safety
Airport Authority 0 Reduced surface congestion None
e Improved safety
* Fewer passenger complaints
Airline e Improved image with customers None
* Better on-time performance
* Reduced fuel costs
Table 2. Pros and cons of extension of the National Playbook
National Playbook Extension
Stakeholder Pros Cons
* Improved re-routing
e Reduced delays 0 CostAir Traffic Control e Reduced communication with ATCSCC * More re-routing(FAA) o National Playbook already developed
* Relatively easy development
* Relatively low development costs
Airport Authority e Reduced delaysA No cost
Airline * Reduced delays
* No cost
Clearly the airport authority and the airlines are likely to support the policy. The FAA is only
likely to support the policy for the facilities with highest delays, and not for every facility where the tool
is likely to be useful. This is because the resources and funding required are likely to be scarce, and their
use requires clear justification. The primary focus of the DOT has also shifted away from congestion and
onto security, since the events of September 11, 2001. There are however calls from many sectors
suggesting that congestion will soon be a primary concern again.
Decision Aiding Tools
This policy involves the implementation of currently developed decision aiding tools at more
airports around the country; the further development of these tools; and the development of other decision
aiding tools that preferably interface with those already developed. The outcome would be reduced
controller workload and improved efficiency of ATC operations in many respects. This would
particularly include improved utilization of restricted fixes and jet-routes, better estimation of weather
impact on the airspace and thus less severe restrictions, and streamlined communications. This would in
turn increase capacity during adverse weather conditions, and thus reduce delays.
The extended implementation of the current decision aiding tools to other facilities would be
directed by the FAA, which operates the facilities. Similarly the development of the current tools, and of
new tools, would ultimately have to be supported, and funded, by the FAA, as the tools would ultimately
be used in the FAA facilities. However the majority of development of the tools would come from private
firms and NASA. Coordination between the developers and the FAA would thus be critical. Pros and
cons of the policy for each of the primary stakeholders are presented in Table 3. This does not include the
contractors, which would be in support of the policy because of the revenue that it would generate.
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Table 3. Pros and cons of further development of decision aiding tools
Decisions Aiding Tools
Stakeholder Pros Cons
* Improved operational efficiency 0 Cost
* Reduced delays e T
Air Traffic Control * Reduced controller workload e Training required, with
(FAA) * DSP and ITWS already developed * learning curve
e Reativly asy eveopmet eResistance to change
* Relatively easy development from controllers expected
* Relatively low development costs
Airport Authority 9 Reduced delaysA No cost
Airline 9 Reduced delays9 No cost
Clearly the airport authority and airlines are likely to support the policy. Any extended use of the
currently developed tools is also likely to be supported by the FAA as the tools have already been
developed, and tested, and thus implementation at other facilities would not add much cost. Further
development of these tools is likely to yield benefits for little added cost, because the basic tools have
already been developed. The development of new tools may however see some resistance from the FAA,
unless the need for the tools is clear. Because the current focus of the DOT is on security, if the new tools
improved security, as well as reducing congestion, support for their development would be improved
significantly.
Airspace Redesign
This policy involves a redesign of the airspace directly impacting the airport in question. The
outcome would be a new airspace design that would improve traffic flows within the airspace. In a
number of cases, because the airspace operated currently is unequipped for the volume of traffic operated
within it, such a redesign may increase the capacity of the airspace significantly and improve the
efficiency of its operation. This would reduce airport delays at airports within the airspace and at other
airports served from the airspace.
The program would likely be funded by the FAA and DOT, because of its magnitude and impact
on the transportation system. Pros and cons of the policy for each of the primary stakeholders are
presented in Table 4. Again, this does not included any contractors, which would be in support of the
policy because of the revenue that it would generate.
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Table 4. Pros and cons of airspace redesign
Airspace Redesign
Stakeholder Pros Cons
* High cost
* Extensive retraining
Air Traffic Control * Improved system operational required, and long
(FAA) efficiency learning curve( Reduced delays * Resistance to change
from controllers expected
* Long term solution
Airport Authority * Reduced delays
e No cost
* Modified procedures
Airline * Reduced delays * Pilot re-training withlearning curve
* Uncertain costs
Clearly the airport authority is likely to support the policy, but it is not clear in the cases of the
FAA or the airlines. An airspace redesign is likely to be very expensive, depending on the specific
airspace being redesigned. It is thus likely that the FAA and DOT will only support redesign of those
airspaces in most need. The complete redesign of the system, which is also currently under consideration,
is likely to occur in stages, enabling the FAA to learn by experience as well as spread the cost over many
years. Primarily because the cost of the redesign to the airlines is unclear, airline support of the policy is
also unclear.
Pre-sequencing Departures
Pre-sequencing of departures would improve departure operations on the ground, and thus reduce
ATC departure delays. The implementation of this policy would however depend on whether the airport
was dominated by a single carrier or not. If a single carrier dominated the airport, that carrier would most
likely be able to pre-sequence departures at the transfer from ramp control to FAA ground control. This
may require an agreement with the FAA to formalize procedures, and would be enhanced if the carrier
had control of any extended ramp area, such as is the case at Newark. Pre-sequencing would allow the
carrier be supply aircraft to the FAA in the most convenient order for the given fix restrictions in place,
unlike those of the other carriers that would not be pre-sequenced. This would mean that during restricted
operations the dominant carrier's aircraft would generally be selected first. The dominant carrier would
thus benefit specifically, whilst the other carriers may actually incur higher delays. Because the action is
market driven, and would not require regulation, however, the action is not analyzed further.
Cooperation between non-dominant carriers is likely to be difficult, because of competition.
Thus, if no carrier dominates the airport, the FAA or airport authority would have to implement the
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policy by introducing regulation. Regulation requiring the airlines to simply coordinate their departures to
be pre-sequenced is unlikely to yield suitable results. On the other hand, a transfer of ramp control from
the airlines to the FAA ground control would require unreasonable resources of the FAA. The most likely
regulatory action would then be to transfer ramp control to the airport authority, as is the case at airports
such as Washington Dulles. The pros and cons of this regulatory action, for each of the primary
stakeholders, are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Pros and cons of pre-sequencing under airport authority control
Pre-sequencing, under airport authority control
Stakeholder Pros Cons
* Pre-sequenced aircraft
Air Traffic Control * Efficient departure operations
(FAA) * Reduced delays
9 No cost
* Better utilization of the airport * High cost
Airport Authority * Opportunity to raise airport fees * Possible Tower
9 Reduced delays construction required
Airline 9 Reduced delays * Less control of flights
e Reduced ramp operating costs * Increased airport fees
Clearly the FAA is likely to support the policy. If the policy were carefully developed all airlines
would benefit with reduced delays, but the increased airport fees likely may still make the policy
unattractive to the airlines. The attractiveness of the policy to the airport authority, which would
implement the policy, is also unclear. This is because of the high cost of the policy, but increased revenue
and improved airport utilization likely.
Decrease in Number of Operations
Decreasing the number of operations at the airport would reduce demand, and would thus reduce
delays. If the flights removed from the schedule were at periods when demand was above capacity,
delays would be reduced directly. If the flights removed were not at periods when demand exceeded
capacity, the size of recovery periods would be increased, and the propagations of delays reduced.
Again, the implementation of this policy would depend on whether the airport was dominated by
a single carrier or not. If the airport were dominated by single carrier this carrier may be able to reduce
the number of flights that it operates at the airport. However, because of the competitive nature of the
industry this would be difficult as competitors would be likely to increase the number of their operations
correspondingly, to improve their market share. Only if the dominant carrier had such a high percentage
of operations that a reduction in its operations would not see a reaction from any competitors at the
airport would such a reduction make sense. Thus, a reduction in the number of operations at an airport
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may often require regulation. This regulation is generally implemented by the airport authority and takes
the shape of demand management, such as slot control or peak hour pricing. The policy's implementation
is generally funded by the airport authority, but in most cases also generates revenue as well. The pros
and cons of this regulatory action, for each of the primary stakeholders, are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Pros and cons of regulation to decrease the number of operations at the airport
Decrease the Number of Operations at the Airport
Stakeholder Pros Cons
Air Traffic Control e Reduced demand
(FAA) 9 Reduced delays
* More efficient operations e Administrations costs
Airport Authority 9 Reduced delays 9 Reduced revenue from
* Revenue from demand management landings
* Reduced operations
Airline * Increased costs of
demand management
Clearly demand management would likely be attractive to the FAA, but not to the airlines,
because of the reduction in revenue and increase in costs that it would induce. The attractiveness of the
policy to the airport authority is unclear, because of the increased costs, but also increased revenues. Such
regulation may also discourage competition, which is an outcome generally avoided by government.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
Of the policies analyzed the extension of the National Playbook to also focus on other airports,
further development of decision aiding tools, and redesign of the most inadequate airspaces all appear
likely to see sufficient support for the policies to be implemented to some extent at least. However, it is
unclear that introducing regulation for pre-sequencing departures, or for decreasing the number of
operations at the airport, will receive support from the necessary stakeholders, which in both cases is the
airport authority. The politics is likely to be complicated, particularly as there is resistance within the
government to increase the amount of regulation in the air transportation industry. Since September 11,
security has also been the primary focus of the government, and not congestion. However, if congestion
becomes a problem again as soon as suggested from many sectors, the government will have no choice
but to implement regulations to reduce delays.
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